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Government Identity Speech Programs: 
Understanding and Applying the New 
Walker Test 




  In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., the 
Court extended its previous holding in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. 
Summum that a city’s donated park monuments were government speech to 
the privately proposed designs that Texas accepts and stamps onto its 
specialty license plates.  The placement of the program into the new 
doctrinal category is significant because the selection criteria for 
government–private speech combinations that produce government speech 
are “exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”  By contrast, when the 
government selects private speakers to participate in a private speech 
forum, its criteria must be reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose and 
viewpoint neutral.  The Walker Court drew from Summum to offer three 
features of the speech access programs to support its reasoning that they 
produced government speech rather than the “purely private speech” that 
emanates from created forums.  Courts have accurately perceived the three 
factors to form a “test,” but have applied it too broadly to all types of 
programs where governments assert that their combinations with private 
entities produce government speech.  The results have been conflicting and 
display confusion about what the prongs of the new test mean and how they 
should be applied to make the critical determination of which government–
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private speech combinations create government identity speech and which 
are forums. 
  In fact, the Walker test appropriately applies only when a government 
entity asserts that its collaboration with private speakers is to convey a 
message about its own “image” or “identity.”  In the context of 
commissioned government speech, the Court has held that a showing of 
government control effective to tailor the content of the private submissions 
to advance the substantive policy objective is sufficient to demonstrate that 
the combination produces government speech.  But when the government’s 
purpose is to fuse private submissions into a broad statement of group 
identity, no determinate policy parameters exist against which to assess 
whether the government’s control over the private speech content is effective 
to achieve the objective.  This difference from the preexisting combinations 
that the Court had labeled “government speech” explains the need to 
articulate a new test to assess a government entity’s claim that its 
combination with private entities produces a government identity message. 
This Article situates the new Walker test within the broader Free Speech 
Clause doctrinal framework, and within the different types of government–
private speech combinations.  It explains the steps of inquiry that lead to 
application of the test, and analyzes each prong in depth, the underlying 
constitutional speech principles, and the relevant evidence.  The final result 
is a blueprint for legal analysis and policymaking at the thin line between 
speech access programs that the government can administer without 
constitutional restraint because they produce government speech and those 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has spoken again, adding one more to its small but 
growing repertoire of cases finding that government–private speech 
combinations produce government speech.1  In Walker v. Texas Division, 
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,2 the Court held that Texas’s program of 
accepting designs proposed by private entities and printing them on the 
background of its specialty license plates transformed the private messages 
into government speech.  Specifically, the Court upheld the Texas 
Department of Motor Vehicles Board’s rejection of the Sons of Confederate 
Veterans’ proposed design that included the confederate battle flag on the 
grounds that many members of the public interpreted the flag design as 
offensive and associated it with groups that advocated hate based upon race.3   
Several years earlier, in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum,4 the Court 
had found a program of accepting privately produced monuments and 
placing them in a city park produced government speech.  In this 
application, the Court upheld the city’s rejection of a private group’s request 
to erect a monument etched with aphorisms of a newly formed religion in a 
park that already displayed a Ten Commandments monument.5 
The consequences of these determinations that the government–private 
speech combinations produced government speech are significant6 because 
they render the selection criteria, and the government’s application of them, 
“exempt from [Free Speech Clause] scrutiny.”7  This means that when the 
government uses private speakers to promulgate its own speech, it may 
choose among privately proposed messages according to the viewpoints they 
 
 1. See infra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
 2. 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2251 (2015). 
 3. Id. at 2245. 
 4. 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009). 
 5. See id.at 465–66. 
 6. This is true even though the concept of “viewpoint neutrality” is not clearly established and 
some forum rules border on viewpoint discriminatory.  See discussion infra Section I.A.  Abner 
Greene argues that this difference should not be so dramatic.  See Abner S. Greene, The Concept of 
the Speech Platform: Walker v. Texas Division, 68 ALA. L. REV. 337, 338 (2016).  Rather, in his 
view, the Court should abandon “a firm rule against viewpoint restrictions” when the government 
creates a “speech platform,” providing space for private speakers.  Id. 
 7. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005); Summum, 555 U.S. at 467.  
Although the Court has said the First Amendment does not apply to government speech, it means the 
Free Speech Clause, because the Establishment Clause limits the content of government speech.  Id.  
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present on controversial public issues.8  
By contrast, when the government selects private speakers to participate 
in a private speech forum, its criteria must at least be viewpoint neutral and 
reasonable in light of the property on which the program takes place.9  
Courts will review the government’s selection of private speakers to ensure 
that the criteria do not discriminate according to viewpoint on their face,10 
are not so vague that they leave room for the forum administrator to 
discriminate,11 and will assess the government’s application of the criteria 
for consistency12 and for reasonableness.13  In making these latter judgments, 
courts may resolve disputes about the social meaning of words and symbols 
and apply their determinations against the government.14   
Neither the rejection of the pro-slavery viewpoint in Walker nor the 
privileging of one private religious viewpoint over another in Summum 
 
 8. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 467–68.  
 9. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).  Greater 
restrictions apply in a traditional or designated public forum.  See infra notes 75–76 and 
accompanying text. 
 10. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 92 F. Supp. 3d 314, 329 (E.D. Pa. 
2015) (“The plain language of the restriction only prohibits expression which disparages certain 
groups. Under the anti-disparagement standard, speech which praises those same groups is clearly 
permissible.  Therefore, the restriction is viewpoint based and unconstitutional . . . .”). 
 11. Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2001) (“controversial” art 
standard creates too much room for viewpoint discrimination); United Food & Commercial Workers 
Union, Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 353–54 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(“controversial public issues”); Christ’s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 
257 (3d Cir. 1998) (“misleading” standard creates pretext for viewpoint discrimination). 
 12. AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 10–12 (1st Cir. 
1994) (where MBTA claimed to be excluding condom-promotion advertisements because they were 
sexually explicit and patently offensive, but MBTA allowed other sorts of sexually explicit 
advertisements, such as movie advertisements, where “unrebutted appearance of viewpoint 
discrimination” is found); Nieto v. Flatau, 715 F. Supp. 2d 650, 655 (E.D.N.C. 2010)  (limit on 
“extremist, indecent, sexist or racist messages”); Vaguely Qualified Prods. LLC v. Metro. Transp. 
Auth., No. 15 Civ. 04952(CM), 2015 WL 5916699 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2015), at *11 (“Assuming, 
arguendo, that VQP’s ads were political, refusing to run two sets of advertisements on either side of 
a political debate about Islam and Muslims cannot be deemed viewpoint neutral when the MTA has 
approved other advertisements addressing issues of cultural import that are similarly, or far more, 
‘political.’”). 
 13. Vaguely Qualified Prods., 2015 WL 5916699, at *11–12 (administrators could not 
reasonably find advertisements for pro-Muslim film stating “The Muslims are Coming!” to be 
demeaning or disparaging). 
 14. Id. 
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would be permissible in a private speech forum.15  In a government–private 
speech combination that produces government speech, however, the specific 
grounds for these decisions need not even be explained.  The distinguishing 
feature of the Walker–Summum paradigm is that the government may 
legitimize its private speech selections by offering only the indeterminate 
purpose of presenting messages consistent with its “image” or “identity.”16  
Moreover, because courts will not review application of the access criteria 
for reasonableness or consistency, the government can arbitrate and act upon 
its own determinations of the disputed meaning of words17 and symbols.18  
Another feature of the paradigm may be that many private applicants will 
gain access to the program, and rejections will be relatively rare.  It is at this 
point that the “selective receptivity” to private messages that helps qualify a 
government–private speech combination as government speech19 edges up to 
and into the “targeted” disadvantaging of unwanted messages, which signals 
unconstitutional regulation of the private speech forum.20  Thus, it is 
critically important to have effective tools to distinguish government–private 
speech combinations that produce government speech from those that are 
forums. 
In Walker, the Court drew three attributes from the Summum opinion, to 
navigate this whisper-thin divide.21  Lower courts have gamely tried to use 
them to evaluate various types of government–private speech combinations, 
 
 15. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 17. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1331–33 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting different meanings that Asian–
American band members and outside entities attach to the name SLANTS), cert. granted sub nom. 
Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
 18. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2262 (2015) 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (noting the different meanings viewers may attach to the confederate flag). 
 19.  See generally Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009) (“City parks . . . 
commonly play an important role in defining the identity that a city projects to its own residents and 
to the outside world.”); Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2247 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471) 
(“‘[O]bservers’ of such monuments . . . ordinarily ‘appreciate the identity of the speaker.’”).  
 20. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (even where 
discretionary criteria are necessary to fulfill the function of a program, a government entity may not 
selectively fund speakers in a way that has the effect of “a penalty on disfavored viewpoints”). 
 21. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2247 (the factors are whether (1) the government has historically 
used the medium for expression, (2) observers are likely to appreciate that the government is 
speaking through the private participants, and (3) the government exercises effective control and 
“final approval authority” over the content of the messages). 
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but the initial results are not encouraging.22  Most fundamentally, courts 
have described and applied the three factors too broadly as the new 
“government speech test.”23  While the attributes may helpfully be described 
and applied as a “test” to determine whether government–private speech 
combinations produce government speech in contexts similar to Summum 
and Walker, there is no indication inside the opinions or out of them that the 
“test” articulated by the Walker Court applies to most government–private 
speech combinations that produce “government speech.”24  Rather, the 
Walker test applies only to the more specific circumstance when the 
government collaborates with private speakers for the purpose of sending a 
message about its “image” or “identity.”25  
  Additionally, within only a number of months after the test’s 
articulation, courts have applied the new test and reached conflicting results 
on whether the privately proposed messages listed in the federal trademark 
registry,26 and, somewhat ironically, on “vanity” license plates, produce 
government speech.27  While it is certainly possible to condemn the test as 
indeterminate and unworkable,28 or to criticize Walker as having reached the 
 
 22. See infra Section I.B.4.b. 
 23.  See, e.g., Comm’r of Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Vawter, 45 N.E.3d 1200, 1204 (Ind. 
2015) (“In Walker, the Supreme Court identified a three-factor standard for identifying government 
speech.”); see also Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Government Brand, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1195, 1197 
(2016) (lamenting the “potentially explosive” ramifications of the Walker test if applied to all types 
of government speech programs).  
 24. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246 (resting its reasoning “primarily on [its] analysis in Summum” 
because it presented a “similar problem”); see infra Section I.B (discussing commissioned 
government speech). 
 25. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
 26. Compare In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (trademark registry is not 
government speech), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), with Pro-Football, 
Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 464 (E.D. Va. 2015) (trademark registry is government 
speech). 
 27. Comm’r of Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Vawter, 45 N.E.3d 1200, 1204 (Ind. 2015) 
(program is government speech); Mitchell v. Md. Motor Vehicle Admin., 126 A.3d 165, 191 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (program is a nonpublic forum). 
 28. The Court’s frequent failure to articulate its “tests” clearly and in ways that can be 
understood and applied by lower courts and others who must work with them is frustrating.  Two 
examples in the free speech area continue to vex lower courts.  First, the Court has described the test 
that applies to distinctions made by a government entity administering a limited public forum 
differently.  Compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (strict scrutiny), with Good 
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (reasonable and viewpoint neutral).  
Second, in setting out the test for regulations aimed at reducing the secondary effects of sexually 
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wrong result,29 these conclusions are not helpful to courts and government 
entities that must apply it to concrete cases—at least until the Court weighs 
in on government speech again.  Moreover, when limited in application to 
government identity speech programs, the Walker test’s prongs can be 
understood and applied both to validate and cabin assertions by government 
entities that they are free to discriminate among private contributions 
according to viewpoint. 
 The purpose of this Article is to work within the confines of the three-
pronged test to uncover its meaning and application beyond monuments and 
license plate designs to all types of government–private speech combinations 
where a government entity may claim to be producing identity speech.30 
Going both wider and deeper than the Court’s explanations aids in 
understanding and applying the prongs of the new test.31  Going wider 
means recognizing that the identity speech test excises programs that, with 
only slight variations, would be private speech forums according to the 
forum “test” the Court applies.32  Although the Court has articulated the two 
 
oriented businesses, the Court has purported to restate the test for time, place, or manner regulations, 
but has left out one of the prongs—twice—even though it applied the prong in its analyses.  See City 
of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002) (“[In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 
475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986),] we stated that the ordinance would be upheld so long as the city of Renton 
showed that its ordinance was designed to serve a substantial government interest and that 
reasonable alternative avenues of communication remained available.”); Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 
288, 293 (1984)) (explaining that a content-neutral regulation must be “narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for communication 
of the information”).   
 29. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2254–64 (Alito, J., dissenting) (pointing out weaknesses in the 
Court’s reasoning); see also David A. Anderson, Of Horses, Donkeys, and Mules, 94 TEX. L. REV. 
SEE ALSO 1, 7 (2015) (“One wonders why the Court took a case with so little real-world importance 
and resolved it in a way that has little precedential value.”). 
 30. Professor Mary Jean Dolan first used the term “identity speech” to describe the program in 
Summum.  Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: Establishment Clause 
Limits After Summum, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3 (2010) [hereinafter Dolan, Establishment 
Clause Limits After Summum].  She also argued in favor of expanding the government speech 
category to include programs where the government produces identity speech.  Mary Jean Dolan, 
The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions of Government 
Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 73 (2004) [hereinafter Dolan, New Extensions of Government 
Speech] (describing these programs as ones where “government has a subjective expressive purpose 
that includes particular values and is carried out through selection of private speakers”). 
 31. See infra Part II.  
 32. See infra Section I.B.4.  
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tests as free-standing, they are, in fact, mirror images.  Both tests hinge most 
basically on the government’s purpose for combining with private entities to 
produce speech.33  A more complete application of the government identity 
speech test incorporates the forum inquiry and asks both sides of the 
questions, thereby making the appropriate comparisons.34 
Going deeper means identifying how each prong of the test functions to 
implement the competing government speech and forum principles.35  Part 
of this analysis identifies how, and how much, the government’s history of 
messaging through a medium can prove its intent and the effect of inviting 
private speakers to participate.36  A deeper part of this analysis explains the 
mystery of why the Court resurrected an inquiry into viewer perception of 
speaker identity in the context of identity speech after rejecting that same 
inquiry when the government commissions private entities to speak on its 
behalf to help fulfill functional objectives.37  The answer is that to gain the 
broad discretion to choose among messages according to viewpoint that 
applies to identity speech, a government entity must show that it could 
rationally believe that a communication between it and viewers is taking 
place.  For this communication to occur, the government must provide 
viewers with sufficient signals to alert them that it has fused the privately 
proposed messages into its own identity message, so that they recognize the 
government as a source, even if not the exclusive source, of the speech.38  
Additionally, inquiry into the “selective receptivity” that the Court says 
characterizes government identity speech selections reveals that it cannot be 
gauged against substantive criteria and it is quite empty when understood 
quantitatively.39  Instead, control effective to transform individual 
submissions into identity speech must be shown through procedures, 
including deep review of the submissions and imposition of identity-
conforming mandates that fuse the individual expressions into a government 
expression of identity.40 
 
 33. See infra Section I.B.4. 
 34. See infra Section II.A. 
 35. See infra Part II.  
 36. See infra Part I.  
 37. See infra notes 364–66 and accompanying text; see also infra Section II.B.3. 
 38. See infra note 369 and accompanying text. 
 39. See infra notes 261–64 and accompanying text.  
 40. See infra note 369 and accompanying text.  
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Part I provides a brief history of government identity speech, situating it 
within the broader category of government speech and adjacent to the 
private speech forums.41  Part I also reviews the development of the Court’s 
new identity speech test and how the lower courts have applied it.42  Part II 
gives an overview of the new test and examines each of its prongs in light of 
both government speech and forum principles.43  Part II also includes a 
flowchart to aid courts in applying the government identity speech 
analysis.44  Part III uses the understandings gained in Part II to apply the test 
to government–private speech interactions over which lower courts have 
split.45 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH 
Government speech, of course, has always existed, but only recently has 
become a defined category in constitutional doctrine.46  While it has long 
been established that the Constitution limits the ability of government 
entities at all levels from discriminating among messages when they regulate 
private speech, it has similarly been understood that when the government 
speaks for itself, “it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from 
determining the content of what it says.”47  Both the individual free speech 
right and the government’s ability to “say what it wishes”48 and “select the 
views that it wants to express”49 stem from democratic imperatives rooted in 
the Constitution.  Unrestricted private speech supports educated participation 
by citizens in the process of selecting the officials and creating the entities 
that carry out the functions necessary to implement the policy choices of the 
 
 41. See infra Part I. 
 42. See infra Section I.B.4. 
 43. See infra Sections II.A–B. 
 44. See infra Section II.C. 
 45. See infra Part III. 
 46. MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT 
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 5–68 (Regents of the Univ. of Cal. ed., 1983) (setting out the many ways 
government entities have always spoken to fulfill their various functions); Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (government speech doctrine is 
“recently minted”). 
 47. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015). 
 48. Summum, 555 U.S. at 467–68 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). 
 49. Id. at 468. 
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electorate.  Government officials and entities must speak to function, and 
they must tailor their speech according content and viewpoint to fulfill their 
democratic mandates to implement the particular policy choices of their 
electorates.  
These principles, and the rules that determine the range of government 
discretion to discriminate by content or viewpoint, are relatively 
uncontroversial at the two extremes of the source-of-speech spectrum.  
Moving inward, however, from “pure” government or “pure” private speech 
to instances where government and private entities combine to produce 
speech, the constitutional principles that should dominate and the rules that 
flow from them become less well defined.  In many instances where the 
government facilitates private speech by granting access to property or 
providing resources, the Free Speech Clause limits the government’s 
discretion to restrict the content of the messages broadcast from the “forum.”      
Nevertheless, the Court has made clear that the government’s freedom to 
pick and choose among viewpoints when it creates its own content also 
applies when it “receives assistance from private sources” to deliver a 
government message.50  Through this interpretation, the Court has carved out 
the new category of “government speech” by means of government–private 
speech combinations.  Additionally, between private speech forums and 
government–private speech combinations that produce government speech 
are programs through which the government curates and presents selected 
private speech according to customary or professional standards of quality or 
relevance to the intended audience.51  In administering these types of 
programs, government entities may make content-sensitive speech selections 
that would not be permissible in a forum, while the First Amendment’s equal 
access principle may limit the range of those selections to some extent.  This 
Part will present the development of these three government–private speech 
combination categories to establish the backdrop against which the Court 
created and defined the more recent category of government–private 
combinations that produce government speech. 
 
 50. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468. 
 51. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.  
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A. Forum Doctrine 
Early in its articulation of the free speech guarantee, the Court 
recognized that the Constitution limits the government’s discretion to 
allocate access to certain types of property that it owns and controls.52  
According to the Court’s interpretation, streets, parks, and sidewalks are 
traditional public forums, “which have immemorially been held in trust for 
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.”53  Because these types of public places are “so historically 
associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights . . . access to them 
for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied 
broadly and absolutely.”54  In addition to implementing the constitutional 
value of promoting public discourse, the traditional public forum concept 
enforces the same “equality of status in the field of ideas” principle that 
applies to government restrictions of private speech that occurs off public 
property and without government assistance.55  Applied to forum access 
decisions, this principle means that “government may not grant the use of a 
forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those 
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.”56 
The equal access principle translates into a doctrine under which 
governments may impose content-neutral time, place, or manner regulations 
to keep order in a traditional public forum.57  However, restrictions on 
private speech according to its content must satisfy strict scrutiny, meaning 
that the government must offer a compelling reason for the discrimination 
and the regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve it.58  Few regulations 
 
 52. Summum, 555 U.S. at 469 (holding the Court “long ago recognized” free speech rights in 
traditional public forums); Harry Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (1965) (identifying the concept of the public forum as “implicit” in the Court’s 
cases). 
 53. Summum, 555 U.S. at 469 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 
 54. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980) (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 515 
(1976)).  
 55. Id. at 463 (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)). 
 56. Id. (quoting Police Dep’t of Chicago, 408 U.S. at 96). 
 57. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). 
 58. Summum, 555 U.S. at 469. 
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can survive this high level of review.59  Access by private speakers to 
traditional public forums does not depend on a decision by the government 
to make the space available for private speech.60  The history and tradition of 
public use of the property for private speech define the few types of 
government property to which broad, nondiscriminatory access is guaranteed 
without respect to the government’s intent to grant it.61 
The Court subsequently interpreted free speech protections to apply to 
private speakers granted access to government property or programs that are 
not traditional government forums.62  By contrast to the historical usage that 
defines the traditional public forum, the government’s purpose for opening 
property or creating a program “that has not traditionally been regarded as a 
public forum” to private speakers establishes the existence and defines the 
scope of a created forum.63  The Court’s most recent list contains three types 
of created forums.64  The government creates a “designated public forum”65 
when it “open[s]” property for “use by the public as a place for expressive 
activity” to an extent that approximates the mandatory openness of the 
traditional public forum.66  A limited public forum exists where a 
government has “reserv[ed a forum] for certain groups or for the discussion 
of certain topics.”67  A nonpublic forum68 comes into being when a 
 
 59. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200 (1992) (upholding a law restricting political 
speech within a certain radius of a polling place, but noting in the context of strict scrutiny applied to 
a content-based regulation in a traditional public forum that “a law rarely survives such scrutiny”). 
 60. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) (“[T]raditional public 
fora are open for expressive activity regardless of the government’s intent.  The objective 
characteristics of these properties require the government to accommodate private speakers.”). 
 61. Id. (citing Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) 
(“The Court has rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic 
confines . . . .”); id. (access to a traditional public forum is “almost unfettered”). 
 62. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015). 
 63. See id. (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 469); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
 64. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250–51. 
 65. Id. at 2250 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 469).  
 66. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).  The Court has 
said that the government creates a designated public forum when it intends to make property that 
hasn’t traditionally been open to assembly and debate “generally available,” Widmar v. Vincent, 454 
U.S. 263, 264–65 (1981), open to “indiscriminate use,” Perry, 460 U.S. at 47, or provides “almost 
unfettered access” to the public for expressive activity, Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678. 
 67. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). 
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government entity provides access to private speakers in the course of 
“acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations.”69 
Through judicial review, courts evaluate and may second-guess the 
government’s assertion of the type of forum it intended to create and, after 
that determination, the government’s claim that it has administered the 
forum appropriately.  Relevant evidence of the type of forum that the 
government intended to create is its “policy and practice” with respect to 
private speaker access and “the nature of the property and its compatibility 
with expressive activity.”70  Judicial interpretation of the “compatibility” 
consideration could implement an analog of the mandatory access that 
applies in a traditional public forum in created forums by inferring an intent 
to open property when allowing access to private speech would not disrupt 
its essential function.71  The Court has not, however, applied the 
compatibility consideration in this way.  Instead, it has applied the 
compatibility consideration in the negative, listing the potential 
 
 68. The Court has not been consistent in using the various forum labels; in a series of cases, it 
failed to list the nonpublic forum as a category.  See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 
U.S. 661, 679 n.11 (2010) (“In conducting forum analysis, our decisions have sorted government 
property into three categories[, which are the traditional, designated, and limited public forums].”); 
Summum, 555 U.S. at 469–70 (listing the designated and limited public forums as sharing the 
“essential attributes of the traditional public forum”); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 
U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (listing the types of “public forums” from which a speaker could be excluded as 
“a traditional or open public forum” and a “limited public forum”).  But see Davenport v. Wash. 
Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007) (mentioning the category of nonpublic forum).  Then, in 
Walker, the Court resurrected the nonpublic forum category, describing its characteristics as 
differing from the limited public forum.  135 S. Ct. at 2251 (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)) (describing the limited public forum as a 
subset of the designated public forum, intentionally opened as a public forum but reserved for certain 
groups or discussion of certain subjects and describing a nonpublic forum as existing when the 
government provides access to private speakers when “acting as a proprietor, managing its internal 
operations”).  Although Justice Thomas joined the Walker majority opinion, he more recently 
asserted that limited public forum and nonpublic forum are different names for the same thing.  Am. 
Freedom Def. Initiative v. King Cty., 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1024–25 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of cert.). 
 69. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 678–79). 
 70. Id. at 2250 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 
(1985)). 
 71. Lillian R. Bevier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories, 1992 
SUP. CT. REV. 79, 101–05 (1992) (explaining that under an “Enhancement Approach” the Court 
could actively review forum managers’ decisions and enforce access whenever it is compatible with 
the use of the forum, but under the Distortion Approach, which has been embraced by the Court, it 
defers to managers’ decisions about compatibility and polices only for viewpoint discrimination). 
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incompatibility of excluded expression as a consideration supporting the 
government’s assertion that it intended to restrict access to the forum.72  
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that a government does not 
create a forum “by inaction or by permitting limited discourse” but only by 
intentional action aimed at opening property for public discourse.73  The 
strong emphasis on government intent as the touchstone of forum creation 
prioritizes the government’s managerial interests over the value of private 
speaker access.74 
Although the doctrine of created forums does not define a substantive 
scope of private speaker access to government property, the Court has 
embedded the equality value into its review of the government’s 
administration of the forum.  It has always been established that exclusions 
from a designated public forum, whatever they may be,75 “are subject to the 
same strict scrutiny as restrictions in a traditional public forum.”76  
Similarly, it has been “black-letter law” that the government may exclude 
speech from a nonpublic forum “so long as the distinctions drawn are 
viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose served by the 
forum.”77  Although the standard of review applicable to exclusions from a 
limited public forum has been in flux, it is now clear that exclusions from a 
limited public forum are subject to the same standard of review as 
 
 72. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 681 (1998) (quoting Miami Herald 
Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974)) (finding where the incompatibility of admitting more 
speakers to a forum may cause forum administrators to close it, a “[g]overnment-enforced right of 
access inescapably dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate”). 
 73. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802). 
 74. Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the 
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1789 (1987). 
 75. The Court has consistently listed the designated public forum as a distinct category and has 
recited that exclusions are subject to the same strict scrutiny review as are exclusions from a 
traditional public forum.  Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 n.11 (2010).  
Nevertheless, since its initial articulation of categories in Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), it has never classified a property or program as a designated 
public forum or subjected exclusions from a forum other than a traditional public forum to 
heightened review.  Lower courts continue to find created forums to be designated public forums 
subject to strict scrutiny but are split as to the attributes that define the category.  See Am. Freedom 
Def. Initiative v. King Cty., 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1024–25 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of 
cert.). 
 76. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2009). 
 77. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007). 
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exclusions from a nonpublic forum.78  So, the requirement that exclusions 
from a created forum reasonably relate to the forum’s purpose and be 
viewpoint neutral establishes a minimum equal access guarantee applicable 
to exclusions from any type of created private speech forum.79 
What the concept of “viewpoint neutrality” means, across free speech 
applications and in particular application to created forums, is far from 
clear.80  In the context of created forums, the Court has only determined that 
excluding groups because of a religious perspective is unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination.81  Lower courts have more actively developed the 
concept.  Courts have found a number of policies to be viewpoint 
discriminatory on their faces82 or because vague standards leave too much 
discretion to administrators to discriminate.83  Courts have found standards 
to be neutral on their faces but viewpoint discriminatory as applied.84  Courts 
and judges have also differed as to how much deference to accord to 
administrators’ judgments on whether particular words or images fall within 
an exclusion standard, sometimes rejecting applications of standards as 
 
 78. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 685 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 829 (1995)) (“The constitutional constraints on the boundaries the State may set bear 
repetition here: ‘The State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not reasonable in light of 
the purpose served by the forum, . . . nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of . . . 
viewpoint.’”).   
 79. Advocates of speaker access have complained that the reasonableness requirement places 
almost no restriction on the government’s ability to limit access to a created forum. See, e.g., C. 
Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 109, 118 (1986) (reasonableness standard is “essentially no review at all”). 
 80. See Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 101 (1996) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court, despite its inspiring rhetoric on the subject [of viewpoint discrimination], 
has not been a model of clarity.”); see also Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 572 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(explaining that the line between content and viewpoint discrimination is “often imprecise”). 
 81. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (finding that viewpoint discrimination is “an egregious form of 
content discrimination,” and the government “must abstain from regulating speech when the specific 
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is that rationale for the restriction”). 
 82. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Dep’t of Aviation of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144, 1157 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(“Although the City describes the category of speech that it wishes to prohibit as that creating ‘a 
hostile business environment,’ these terms have meaning only when considered in the context of the 
viewpoint that the ALPA wishes to express.”); NAACP v. Philadelphia, 39 F. Supp. 3d 611, 634 
(E.D. Pa. 2014) (establishing that the standard that advertisements cannot reflect poorly on the city is 
viewpoint discriminatory). 
 83. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 84. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
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unreasonable.85  In addition to the viewpoint neutrality requirement itself, 
the uncertainty that surrounds its meaning effectively restricts the scope of 
government administrators’ choices among speakers, because it deters them 
from applying standards that may provoke time-consuming and costly 
challenges.86  So, despite the Court’s failure to define the viewpoint 
neutrality concept precisely or enforce it rigorously outside the context of 
religious expression, the prospect of judicial review of forum administration 
for reasonableness and viewpoint discrimination acts as a real limit on 
government speech selections.   
B. Commissioned Government Speech 
The Court first mentioned the category of government speech in the 
context of finding a government–private speech interaction to be a created 
forum.87  In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, the 
Court relied upon a public university’s written policy distancing itself from 
funded speech and found the government’s intent in collecting and 
distributing funds to student groups was to “encourage a diversity of views 
from private speakers.”88  The Court distinguished government speech, 
noting that the government may constitutionally “regulate the content of 
what is or is not expressed” when it crafts its educational program, “when it 
is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own 
message.”89  In subsequent decisions, the Court has explained that 
 
 85. See supra note 13.  In In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub 
nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), the Patent and Trademark Office rejected trademarks for a 
band’s name, the SLANTS, as demeaning and disparaging.  However, the Asian–American band 
members say that they are “reclaiming a term once used as an insult and transforming it into a 
statement of cultural pride.”  Justices Considering Offensive Trademarks, HERALD & REV. (Jan. 16, 
2017), http://herald-review.com/justices-considering-offensive-trademarks/article_a3239398-bc66-
582f-b14b-a2118a61c4d3.html. 
 86. See, e.g., Emma G. Fitzsimmons, M.T.A. Board Votes to Ban Political Ads on Subways and 
Buses, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/nyregion/mta-board-votes-
to-ban-political-ads-on-subways-and-buses.html (transit agency changes advertising policy to avoid 
legal challenges associated with rejecting certain political ads). 
 87. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833, 841–42 (1995). 
 88. Id. at 834–35 (noting that in its agreement with student groups, “[t]he University declares 
that the student groups eligible for [Student Activity Fund] support are not the University’s agents, 
are not subject to its control, and are not its responsibility”). 
 89. Id. at 833. 
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democratic principles of function90 and accountability91 ground the 
government’s ability to discriminate according to content and viewpoint 
when it interacts with private entities to produce government speech.   
The Rosenberger Court harked back to Rust v. Sullivan,92 in which it 
upheld a federal program prohibiting funded doctors from discussing 
abortion as an option.93  It distinguished the provision of funds to private 
doctors from a created forum, noting that “the government did not create a 
program to encourage private speech but instead used private speakers to 
transmit specific information pertaining to its own program.”94  Because the 
structure of the program demonstrated that its purpose was to enlist “private 
entities to convey a governmental message,” the government could, without 
restriction by the Constitution’s free speech guarantee, “take legitimate and 
appropriate steps to ensure that its message [wa]s neither garbled nor 
distorted by the grantee.”95 
In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, the Court again found a 
government–private speech combination to produce government speech.96  
At issue was a portion of a federal beef promotion program that funded 
advertisements created by a board made up of private industry 
representatives and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture.97  Beef 
producers forced by law to help fund the advertising campaign argued that 
they were unconstitutionally compelled to subsidize promulgation of a 
viewpoint with which they disagreed.98  Despite the assistance from the 
 
 90. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) 
(quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009)) (“‘[I]t is not easy to imagine 
how government could function if it lacked th[e] freedom’ to select the messages it wishes to 
convey.”). 
 91. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (noting 
that when the government speaks, it is “accountable to the electorate and the political process for its 
advocacy”). 
 92. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).  
 93. Id. at 196; see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The Court 
in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors 
under Title X amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, 
however, we have explained Rust on this understanding.”). 
 94. 515 U.S. at 833.  
 95. Id. 
 96. 544 U.S. 550, 566–67 (2005). 
 97.  Id. at 551. 
 98. Id. at 550–51. 
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private board in crafting the content of the advertisements, the Court held the 
content to be government speech because the government “effectively 
controlled” the messaging.99  Congress “set out the overarching message and 
some of its elements,” agency officials attended and participated in some of 
the meetings where message proposals were developed, and the Secretary 
exercised “final approval authority over every word used in every 
promotional campaign.”100  Three dissenting justices argued that the 
government must effectively disclose its messaging role to fulfill the 
democratic accountability principle that underpins the exemption of 
government speech from Free Speech Clause restraints.101  The Court, 
however, found enactment and administration of the messaging mandate 
through legitimate and transparent political processes to fulfill the 
accountability requirement.102 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,103 the Court applied the theory of government 
control over private speech it funds or “commission[s]” to the workplace.  
The Court held that the government employer did not violate a deputy 
district attorney’s First Amendment rights when supervisors disciplined him 
for writing a memo to them complaining of problems in the prosecution of a 
criminal case.104  As with enlisted private speakers, the Court traced the 
government’s discretion to discriminate according to content and viewpoint 
in rewarding or punishing employee speech to its need to do so to function 
effectively.105  The feature significant to classifying employee speech as 
 
 99. Id. at 560.  
 100. Id. at 561. 
 101. Id. at 577–78 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“It means nothing that Government officials control the 
message if that fact is never required to be made apparent to those who get the message . . . .”). 
 102. Id. at 563 (majority opinion) (“[T]he beef advertisements are subject to political safeguards 
more than adequate to set them apart from private messages.  The program is authorized and the 
basic message prescribed by federal statute, and specific requirements for the promotions’ content 
are imposed by federal regulations promulgated after notice and comment.  The Secretary of 
Agriculture, a politically accountable official, oversees the program, appoints and dismisses the key 
personnel, and retains absolute veto power over the advertisements’ content, right down to the 
wording.  And Congress, of course, retains oversight authority, not to mention the ability to reform 
the program at any time.  No more is required.”). 
 103. 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006). 
 104. Id. at 421. 
 105. Id. at 418 (“Government employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of 
control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the 
efficient provision of public services.”).  
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government speech is that it is uttered “pursuant to [the employee’s] official 
duties.”106   
The Court has described government access allocations to a government 
speech program as outside Free Speech Clause restraints.107  It is important 
to recognize, however, that this freedom from judicial review applies to a 
government entity’s administration of a government–private combination 
that is properly classified as a government speech program.  The questions 
whether a particular program produces government speech, and the 
boundaries of the program, are judicial determinations.  As described above, 
the government’s need to control commissioned speech to fulfill its 
legitimate functions explains the discretion to discriminate, and so the link 
between speech content control and furthering a government program 
establishes the boundary of a program administrator’s freedom from Free 
Speech Clause constraint.  When the government seeks to control the 
content of a speaker outside the boundaries of the government speech 
program, constitutional limits apply to its decision making.108 
C. Government-Curated Speech Selections 
In a third set of government–private speech combinations, the Court has 
found that certain types of quality-curator roles require government entities 
to make subjective, “content-based” choices among private speakers, which 
 
 106. Id. at 421–22 (“Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional 
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.  
It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned 
or created.”).  Persons employed by the government may also speak on matters of public concern, in 
which instance constitutional limits apply to their employers’ ability to control the content of their 
speech.  Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377 (2014) (noting that Pickering v. Board of Education 
of Township High School District 205, Will County, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) “provides the 
framework for analyzing whether the employee’s interest or the government’s interest should prevail 
in cases where the government seeks to curtail the speech [on public concern] of its employees”). 
 107. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (“The Free Speech Clause . . . 
does not regulate government speech.”). 
 108. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379–80 (employer control of speech by employees on matters of public 
concern, as opposed to owing its existence to the employees’ fulfillment of job responsibilities, is 
subject to constitutional constraint); Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. 
Ct. 2321, 2328 (2013) (noting, with respect to the constitutionality of funding conditions beyond 
only government speech programs that limit recipients’ speech, “the relevant distinction that has 
emerged from our cases is between conditions that define the limits of the government spending 
program—those that specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions that seek to 
leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself”). 
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would not be permissible in a private speech forum.109  The speech produced 
through these types of combinations differs from commissioned government 
speech in that the government does not present the private speech selections 
as its own. 
In United States v. American Library Ass’n,110 the Court upheld a 
congressional command that libraries receiving federal funding limit 
patrons’ access to pornography.111  According to the plurality, “[t]o fulfill 
their traditional missions, public libraries must have broad discretion to 
decide what material to provide to their patrons.”112  The plurality looked to 
prior cases to identify “two analogous contexts” in which the Court held 
“that the government has broad discretion to make content-based judgments 
in deciding what private speech to make available to the public.”113  One of 
these is “a public television station’s editorial judgments regarding the 
private speech it presents to its viewers.”114  The other is when the 
government entity’s role requires it to make quality judgments among 
competing private speakers, such as when the National Endowment of the 
Arts makes funding decisions.115 
Government entities occupying these roles often choose among and 
present a wide variety of private viewpoints without being able to justify 
their selectivity by identifying a non-speech functional objective that 
requires content control of “commissioned” private speech to achieve it.116  
These government–private speech combinations thus exist at the border of 
private speech forums, which can look much the same.117  Nevertheless, the 
professional role cases are properly read to involve just that—a government 
entity occupying a role “traditionally occupied by professionals in a field,” 
 
 109. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 19.16 (3d ed. 
1996) (describing the “professionalism principle,” according to which decisions concerning the 
content of speech are committed “to the sound discretion of professionals in the field”). 
 110. 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion).  
 111. Id. at 214. 
 112. Id. at 204. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682–83 (1998) (finding the 
candidate debate at issue to be a nonpublic forum, but noting that most other broadcaster decisions 
require greater subjectivity than would be permissible in a private speech forum). 
 115. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
 116. Compare Section I.B.3, with Sections I.B.1, I.B.2.  
 117. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677–78 (defining private speech forum).   
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employing “criteria that have evolved within their areas of expertise.”118  So, 
while the role requires subjective choices among private speakers, standards 
that cabin the exercise of discretion, at least somewhat, exist both 
traditionally and within the delegations.119  These standards, although vague, 
limit the justifications a government entity may offer for its viewpoint-based 
decision-making and place some types of viewpoint discrimination out of 
bounds.120  The need for a government entity to demonstrate that its 
legitimate functions require it to curate and present private speech according 
to customary, professional or otherwise recognized quality standards that 
cabin its discretion to discriminate invidiously among speech applicants 
limits the types of government–private speech combinations that may fall 
within this category. 
D. Government Identity Speech 
1. Summum, Walker, and the Identity Speech Test 
The government–private speech combinations present in the two most 
recent government speech cases do not fit within either of the existing 
paradigms.  The Court explicitly rejected classifying the combinations as 
created forums.121  It implicitly rejected the models of curated private speech 
and commissioned government speech by articulating attributes of 
government–private speech combinations that produce government identity 
speech.122  These are different from the attributes that justify the 
government’s discretion to discriminate according to private speech content 
 
 118. See SMOLLA, supra note 109, at § 19:16. 
 119. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 203–04 (2003) (noting that 
libraries exist to “facilitat[e] learning and cultural enrichment” and collect only those materials 
deemed to have “requisite and appropriate quality”); Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673 (public broadcasters 
exercise discretion “to fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations”); Finley, 524 U.S. 
at 585–86 (quoting Advocates for Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795 (1st Cir. 1976)) (arts grants 
are “awarded according to the ‘artistic worth of competing applicants,’” according to an 
“‘excellence’ threshold for NEA support”). 
 120. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 236 (Souter, J., dissenting) (library selections may not 
exclude all books advocating a particular point of view); Finley, 524 U.S. at 582 (arts funding may 
not be used as “a tool for invidious viewpoint discrimination”). 
 121. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2251 (2015); cf. 
supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text.  
 122. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249–51. 
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when selecting contributions to produce these types of speech.  As described 
by the Court, government identity speech is located at the border of created 
forums.123  On the one hand, the government has broad discretion to 
discriminate according to viewpoint among private participants when 
producing identity speech without tying its determinations to recognized 
quality standards or a functional objective that the private speech must be 
tailored to achieve.  On the other hand, and unlike the speech that emanates 
from forums, private contributions to image or identity are transformed, 
somehow, into speech by the government, even as the private messaging 
appears to take place simultaneously. Features of these types of 
government–private speech combinations, identified in the two recent 
decisions, provide clues as to the Court’s theory of how and why this 
transformation takes place. 
In Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, the City had placed fifteen 
permanent displays in its downtown public park, a number of which were 
privately created and donated.124  Its rejection of a stone monument offered 
by the Summum church prompted a lawsuit in which the church claimed that 
it had a constitutionally guaranteed right of access to the public space.125  
The Court, however, held the monument program to be government 
speech.126  In its analysis, the Summum Court harked back, in part, to the 
“effectively control” consideration it articulated in Johanns v. Livestock 
Marketing Ass’n.127  Although the city did not set out an overarching 
message or publish criteria prior to its decisions on the proposed 
donations,128 or participate in developing the message of the monuments, the 
Court found the city’s “final approval authority” over the selection of the 
monuments for the purpose of projecting an “image” or “identity” to be 
sufficient to establish effective control.129  The Court explicitly rejected 
 
 123. See id.; Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).  
 124. 555 U.S. at 464–65. 
 125. Id. at 465. 
 126. Id. at 481. 
 127. Id. at 473 (referencing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005)). 
 128. Id. at 465 (noting that after denying the church’s donation, the city formalized the criteria it 
had given for the denial, which were that monuments “either (1) directly relate to the history of 
Pleasant Grove, or (2) were donated by groups with longstanding ties to the Pleasant Grove 
community”). 
 129. Id. at 473.  Earlier in its opinion, as part of establishing a presumption that donated 
monuments are government speech, the Court noted that municipalities generally exercise editorial 
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imposing a requirement that the city articulate more precisely the message it 
intends to convey when accepting a donated monument.130  In its inquiry, the 
Court relied also on a historical demonstration that government entities and 
officials have used monuments to speak to the public throughout history, and 
its conclusion that viewers who see monuments on public property, whether 
or not they are donated, will understand that the government is speaking.131  
It primarily distinguished situations where a public–private speech 
combination can be a public forum involving property or a program that is 
“capable of accommodating a large number of . . . speakers without 
defeating the essential function of the land or the program.”132 
In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,133 
reviewing a state specialty license plate program, the Court faced the same 
question: By publishing privately created messages through the program, 
had the state transformed them into government speech, or was the program 
a private speech forum in which it could not discriminate according to 
viewpoint in its speech selections?  This time, however, the designs were not 
permanent structures, and there was no shortage of space.134  The Court 
nevertheless held the hundreds of background designs to be government 
speech.135  It looked back to its decision in Summum, which relied in part on 
Johanns, and formalized the considerations into a three-part test.136  First, it 
noted that with both permanent monuments and license plate background 
designs, governments—including the government entity that is the subject of 
the lawsuit—have historically used the medium to speak to the public.137  
Second, the Court concluded that license plate designs, like permanent 
monuments, “are often closely identified in the public mind with the [State]” 
because the State produces the plates and requires their display and, most 
obviously, because the State stamps its name in large letters at the top of the 
 
control through more formalized requirements and participation in the design process.  Id. at 471. 
 130. Id. at 476 (“[I]t frequently is not possible to identify a single ‘message’ that is conveyed by 
an object or structure . . . .”). 
 131. Id. at 471. 
 132. Id. at 478. 
 133. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
 134. Id. at 2249 (acknowledging that “[h]ere, a State could theoretically offer a much larger 
number of license plate designs, and those designs need not be available for time immemorial”). 
 135. Id. at 2253.  
 136. Id. at 2247.  
 137. Id. at 2248. 
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plate.138  Third, the Court found that “like the city government in Summum,” 
Texas had “effectively controlled” the messages sent by the background 
design on the plates by exercising “selective receptivity” to proposals and 
“final approval authority” over the designs and messages.139  The Court 
observed that Texas law gives its Motor Vehicles Board “sole control” over 
the designs and that the Board and its predecessor “actively exercised this 
authority” by rejecting “at least a dozen proposed designs.”140  Once again, 
the Court did not require that the State articulate a specific message sent by 
single plates or the combination, finding that a purpose to select plates “to 
present itself and its constituency” was sufficient to demonstrate that the 
plate program produced government speech.141 
The Walker Court could not distinguish the forum cases based on 
capacity.142  Instead, it addressed more directly the forum precedents in 
terms of the key indicator of a forum—the government’s demonstrated 
intent to create one—and the elements in its new three-part test.143  
According to the Court, the State did not intend to create a designated or 
limited forum for public discourse for the reasons it found the designs to be 
government speech—the plates have “traditionally been used for 
government speech,” they “bear the State’s name,” and the State exercises 
“final authority” over each design.144  Because these features indicate that 
Texas “explicitly associates itself with the speech on its plates,” it did not 
intend to create a forum for “purely private” speech.145 
For “similar reasons,” the Court found that the specialty license plate 
program was not a nonpublic forum—the State was not simply interacting 
with private speakers in the course of “managing its internal operations,” 
because it intended to convey a government message through the private 
speakers, and viewers would likely perceive the speech that way.146  
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 2247 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 473 (2009)). 
 140. Id. at 2249. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 2247–49. 
 144. Id. at 2251.  
 145. Id. at 2250–51. 
 146. Id. at 2251 (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 378–
79 (1992)). 
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Although a program of selling advertising space on public vehicles may 
create a nonpublic forum,147 “the existence of government profit alone is 
insufficient to trigger forum analysis.”148  So, the fact that Texas made 
money through its specialty plate program did not change its 
characterization as government speech.  Additionally, advertising space “is 
traditionally available for private speech,” and the program addressed by the 
Court, in which the messages were located on city buses, “bore no indicia 
that the speech was owned or conveyed by the government.”149  Whereas a 
program of providing private groups access to a public school mail system 
by “permission from the individual school principal” created a nonpublic 
forum,150 each specialty license plate design is “formally approved by and 
stamped with the imprimatur of Texas,” which means that the program 
produces government speech.151  Similarly, a specialty license plate program 
is not like the federal government’s Combined Federal Campaign.  The 
charitable campaign, which occurs in federal workplaces, lacks a history of 
government messaging, gives no reason for employees to interpret the 
private solicitations as bearing a government imprimatur, and is designed to 
manage private solicitations to minimize workplace disruption, not to 
“communicate messages from the government.”152 
By contrast to the unanimous Summum decision, Walker was a close 
case, decided 5–4 with a strong dissent.153  In the view of the dissenting 
justices, the program of selling space on license plates created a limited 
public forum.154  The dissenters found the history of privately proposed plate 
designs155 and viewers’ perception of the messaging156 supported the 
 
 147. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 301–02 (1974) (plurality opinion); 
Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2252 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 n.6 (1992)) (noting 
that R.A.V. identified the program in Lehman as a nonpublic forum). 
 148. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2252. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 2251. 
 151. Id. at 2251–52 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 3748–49 
(1983)). 
 152. Id. at 2252. 
 153. In the majority were Justices Thomas, Ginsberg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer, who 
authored the opinion.  Id. at 2243–54.  Justice Alito wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Roberts, 
Scalia, and Kennedy.  Id. at 2254–63 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 154. Id. at 2262 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 155. Id. at 2260 (plates that express messages chosen by private entities are “quite new”). 
 156. Id. at 2255 (suggesting that viewers could not reasonably perceive designs as messaging “the 
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conclusion that the plates constituted private speech.  As to state control, the 
dissenters found insufficient evidence in the record to conclude that Texas 
exercised “selective receptivity” sufficient to transform the private messages 
into government speech.157  According to the dissent, the majority’s decision 
“passes off private speech as government speech and, in doing so, 
establishes a precedent that threatens private speech that government finds 
displeasing.”158 
The Summum–Walker duo establishes the category of government 
identity speech through private speakers.  According to the Court, this 
category is necessary to allow governments to fulfill their democratic 
mandates.159  Quite obviously, however, and as noted by the Walker dissent, 
it threatens to undermine the equal access values that forum doctrine 
implements.  By contrast to commissioned government speech or curated 
private speech selections, no substantive programmatic purpose or 
customary and recognized quality standards limit the scope of the viewpoint 
discrimination that governments may exercise when selecting private 
speakers to present their “images” or “identities.”160  Consequently, the 
definition of this new type of government identity speech through private 
speakers is highly significant because it identifies the tipping point between 
promulgating speech to implement majority will and protecting equal access 
for individual speakers to property and resources regardless of their 
viewpoints. 
2. The Walker Test in the Lower Courts 
Undoubtedly, the Walker Court intended its three-part test to guide 
government entities and lower courts as they navigate the divide between 
government–private speech interactions that produce government identity 
 
views of the State of Texas and not those of the owners of the cars”). 
 157. Id. at 2260. 
 158. Id. at 2254. 
 159. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481–82 (2009).  
 160. The Summum Court used the term “editorial control” to describe the monument selection 
process, but notably it did not cite any of its media precedents, which confer discretion on the 
selection and presentation of private speech.  Summum, 555 U.S. at 472.  Instead, it emphasized that 
privately created monuments became government speech because their messages became the 
government’s own.  Id. 
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speech and those that create private speech forums.161  Lower courts are 
beginning to address programs at the government speech–forum intersection 
in light of Walker, and the results are not promising.162 
a. Vanity License Plates 
Most directly on point, two lower courts applying the Walker test have 
come to different conclusions about how to characterize a personalized or 
“vanity” license plate program, a part of the Texas license plate program that 
the Court did not address.163  Vanity plate programs allow individuals to 
select a “personalized” combination of letters and numbers to replace the 
alphanumeric sequence that the state would otherwise issue for the purpose 
of vehicle identification.164  The letter–number sequence is stamped over the 
plate’s background design.165  Typically, the state agency responsible for 
motor vehicle registration reviews each application and issues rejections 
based on standards embodied in legislation, regulations, or more informal 
guidelines or lists.166  Whatever the type of standards, they are often broad 
enough to authorize any denial an agency may choose to make.167  Part of 
the fun of the plates is capturing meaning in the 6–8 characters that can fit 
on the plate. Thus, some plates with unwanted messages slip past the 
agency’s initial review.  Agencies usually retain the ability to recall plates 
that have been issued once they become aware of an unwanted meaning 
through motorist complaints or otherwise.168 
Indiana’s Supreme Court applied the Walker test and held its state’s 
 
 161. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246 (majority opinion). 
 162. See infra Sections I.D.2.a–c. 
 163. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2244 n.4 (2015); Comm’r of Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Vawter, 
45 N.E.3d 1200, 1208 (Ind. 2015) (program is government speech); Mitchell v. Md. Motor Vehicle 
Admin., 126 A.3d 165, 177 (Md. App. 2015) (program is a nonpublic forum). 
 164. See, e.g., Mitchell, 126 A.3d at 170.  
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 171 (“objectionable plate list” kept and updated by the agency). 
 167. Id. at 170 (agency has discretion to “refuse any combination of letters and numerals” 
requested); Vawter, 45 N.E.3d at 1202 (agency may reject any combination that “(1) carries a 
connotation offensive to good taste and decency; (2) would be misleading; or (3) the bureau 
otherwise considers improper for issuance”). 
 168. Mitchell, 126 A.3d at 171 (agency recalled plate with “MIERDA,” the Spanish word for 
“shit,” which the applicant had had stamped on a plate with the special agricultural plate design and 
motto, “Our Farms, Our Future”). 
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vanity plate program to be government speech.169  First, it described the 
letter–number combinations as being “identifiers for public, law 
enforcement, and administrative purposes.”170  It then moved to describe the 
history of state slogans appearing on the backgrounds of license plates.171  
The court rejected the challenger’s argument that the state’s historical 
practice of government messaging via license plates does not extend to the 
letter–number sequence, which has always been “individually-crafted” and 
“unique.”172  Rather, “history shows that Indiana often communicates 
through its license plates,” and the vanity program is properly viewed as an 
“expan[sion of] how it does so.”173  Moreover, the court added, vanity plates 
“are no more unique than public park monuments, which ‘typically represent 
government speech.’”174 
Second, and for the same reasons as recited in Walker, the court 
determined that the alphanumeric combinations “are often closely identified 
in the public mind with the [State].”175  The court listed the name at the top 
of the plate, its official function, and the ease with which individuals could 
send their messages via bumper sticker or window decal were they not 
seeking the imprimatur of the state.176  In response to the argument that 
viewers could not possibly believe the state would embrace all vanity plate 
messages, the court responded that the dissent made that argument in Walker 
and lost.177  The categorization does not depend upon how every viewer 
perceives the source of every message.178  The relevant question is how 
viewers are likely to perceive the source of the vanity plate messaging 
generally. 
Third, the court found that Indiana maintains effective control over all 
of the letter–number sequences that appear on its plates.179  The challengers 
argued that Indiana did not exercise control because its statutory mandate 
 
 169. Vawter, 45 N.E.3d at 1206. 
 170. Id. at 1204. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 1205 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009)). 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. at 1206.  
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
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was so broad and its guidelines allowed it to approve or reject plates for any 
reason.180  The court responded that regardless of the scope of its discretion, 
the state by statute has final approval authority, which it exercises with 
regularity.181  Because it found all three of the Walker prongs met, the court 
concluded that the Indiana vanity plate program is government speech.182 
Several weeks later, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that 
its state’s vanity license plate program is not government speech.183  The 
court was aware of the Indiana Supreme Court’s result but found it 
“unpersuasive”184 and, in fact, disagreed with the Indiana court’s application 
of the Walker test in almost every respect.185  First, the court gave a nod to a 
historical inquiry by noting that, in contrast to the norm, Maryland does not 
have a long and robust tradition of using the background of its standard base 
plates for government messaging.186  The court distinguished a plate’s 
background design, which can be displayed by many motorists, from the 
letter–number combination, which when “personalized,” becomes imbued 
with “intrinsic meaning . . . that is independent of mere identification and 
specific to the owner.”187  Then, it used this observation to flip its conclusion 
about the traditional expressive use of the relevant medium: “[H]istorically, 
vehicle owners have used vanity plates to communicate their own personal 
message and the State has not used vanity plates to communicate any 
message at all.”188 
 
 180. Id.  
 181. Id.  
 182. Id.  
 183. Mitchell v. Md. Motor Vehicle Admin., 126 A.3d 165, 177, 185–86 (Md. App. 2015) 
(concluding that the program is a nonpublic forum but nevertheless upholding the recall of the plate 
that prompted the lawsuit because it found the “profanity” prohibition reasonable and viewpoint-
neutral). 
 184. Id. at 185. 
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. at 184 (“Until [2010 when it adopted a ‘War of 1812’ design], Maryland’s standard 
license plates did not urge, promote, or tout anything about itself.”).  But see id. at 183 n.23 (noting 
that the base plate for 1934 bore the word “Tercentenary,” honoring Maryland’s 300th anniversary, 
and that from 1942 through 1947, the plate read “Drive Carefully,” but noting that the latter “is not a 
State slogan in that it does not concern Maryland in particular”); id. at 183 n.25 (noting that in 1976 
Maryland began designing and issuing a number of different types of commemorative plates, which 
individuals can purchase as an alternative to the base plates). 
 187. Id. at 184.  
 188. Id. at 185. 
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Second, the court rejected the Indiana Supreme Court’s conclusion that 
the state’s name on the plate, its governmental origin and official, 
identifying function dominate viewers’ perceptions of the origin of the 
speech on every part of the plate.189  Instead, the “personal nature of a vanity 
plate message makes it unlikely” that viewers will perceive it as coming 
from the State.190  Unlike background designs, which display emblems and 
slogans produced by a template, vanity plate messages are not, according to 
the court, “official-looking.”191  Given the “plainly personal nature” of 
vanity plate messages, viewers would not assume that just because the State 
allowed the message to be printed, that it endorsed it as its own.192 
Finally, the Maryland court did not view the undisputed power that the 
Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) exercises to review every 
vanity plate application and to reject those deemed objectionable as 
sufficient to establish effective control over the message.193  In contrast to 
the specialty plate approval process, which the court characterized as 
“stringent,” vanity plates undergo only an “initial screening,” which may fail 
to detect messages the MVA would disapprove of.194  According to the 
Maryland court, these aspects of the process mean that the MVA does not 
“exert[] such tight control” that the vanity plate messages become 
government speech.195 
b. Trademarks 
Lower courts have also split in applying the Walker test to the federal 
program of registering trademarks.196  Relying on statutory authority, the 
government has argued that it may fail to register or cancel marks because of 
the viewpoints they express.197  The district court for the Eastern District of 
 
 189. Id. at 185–86. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 186. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Compare In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. 
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), with Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 458 (E.D. Va. 
2015). 
 197. See Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 453 (noting that “[Trademark Trial and Appeal 
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Virginia reviewed the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (TTAB) 
cancellation of the registrations of various “REDSKINS” trademarks on the 
ground that the message “may disparage” a substantial composite of Native 
Americans and bring them into contempt or disrepute.198  The Court 
addressed the three Walker prongs quite briefly.199  It found the first Walker 
factor was met because “registry with the federal trademark registration 
program communicates the message that the federal government has 
approved the trademark.”200  As to the second prong, it found “the public 
closely associates federal trademark registration with the federal government 
as the insignia for federal trademark registration, ®, is a manifestation of the 
federal government’s recognition of the mark.”201  And third, it found the 
“effective control” prong was met because “the federal government 
exercises editorial control over the federal trademark registration program,” 
as it did by cancelling the REDSKINS trademark.202 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en 
banc, reviewed the TTAB’s refusal to register THE SLANTS as a trademark 
on the same ground that it “may disparage” persons of Asian descent.203  In 
its view, the government’s claim in support of the denial was “at odds with 
the Supreme Court’s analysis in Walker and unmoored from the very 
concept of government speech.”204  The closest the court came to addressing 
the history prong was to note that “[w]hen the government registers a 
trademark, the only message it conveys is that a mark is registered.”205  As to 
viewer perception gleaned from the nature of the property, it contrasted 
 
Board (TTAB)] itself pointed out that it is only empowered to cancel the statutory registration of the 
marks under Section 2(a)” if it does not approve of the viewpoint expressed).  
 198. Id. at 450, 467–68 (citing § 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012)). 
 199. Id. at 458–59.  The court issued its opinion only a few weeks after the Walker decision.  See 
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).  In addition to the 
Walker test, the court applied the government speech test developed in the Fourth Circuit and found 
the trademark program to be a subsidy in which viewpoint discrimination is permissible.  Pro-
Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 459–60 (citing Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of 
Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
 200. Id. at 458. 
 201. Id. at 458–59.  
 202. Id. 
 203. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 
S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
 204. Id. at 1346. 
 205. Id. 
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trademarks with license plates: the government does not “own[],” 
“monopolize[],” “size[],” or “format[]” trademarks, and they are not 
“immediately understood as performing any government function (like 
unique, visible vehicle identification)” or otherwise “aligned with the 
government.”206  The court noted that the government “routinely registers” 
marks that “no one can say the government endorses” and listed examples of 
trademark messages that contradict official government policy.207  
According to the court, to the extent that trademarks are expressive, viewers 
associate the messages with the private sellers who use them, not with the 
government.208  Finally, the court did not find the acts undertaken by the 
government in “processing” trademarks—the act of registration including 
granting the right to use the registry symbol, issuing a registration certificate, 
or listing trademarks in the government’s database—to be sufficient 
“control” to meet the third prong of the Walker test.209  In the court’s view, 
equal access and protection against “rampant viewpoint discrimination”—
not the government’s functional need to speak—was the principle that 
governed the result of the case.210 
c. Advertising Space on Government Property 
The dispute over application of the “demeaning or disparaging” standard 
to trademarks is, in fact, just one manifestation of a controversy that is 
erupting across a number of government–private speech combination 
programs.  Comparing the dispute in Walker to other disputes between the 
government and programs that solicit private advertising on government 
property illustrates the very thin line between government combinations with 
private speakers that produce identity speech and those that create forums.  
In Walker, the Texas DMV Board relied upon application of a form of the 
“disparaging or demeaning” standard to reject the confederate flag logo.211  
 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 1348. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015).  The 
Board explained that public comments indicated that many members of the general public find the 
design “offensive,” the comments “reasonable,” and that the message was an expression of “hate . . . 
that is demeaning to . . . people or groups.”  Id. at 2258 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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The Court upheld the Board’s authority to reject the design on this ground, 
even though it accepted other designs that members of other groups may 
perceive as demeaning.212  Meanwhile, controversy over the constitutionality 
of the “demeaning or disparaging to individuals or groups” standard in 
advertising space programs is raging through the lower courts.213  Courts are 
split as to whether the standard, stated generally, meets the forum doctrine’s 
viewpoint-neutrality requirement.214  However, where the standard 
distinguishes among groups, as in Walker, courts are more likely to find that 
it results in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination in a program that is 
classified as a private speech forum.215 
So, classification of the program as a forum or as government speech 
makes all the difference.  However, the apparent differences between the 
license plates designs addressed in Walker and advertising on public 
property are slight.216  States sell license plate access to private speakers, 
place the designs on government property, and display them to the public, 
individually and as a compilation.217  These same things are true of private 
advertisements that appear on all sorts of government property.218  
Government entities and courts have assumed that advertising space creates 
some sort of private speech forum.219  Walker, however, creates an opening 
with respect to the multiple variations of advertising space220 and the many 
 
 212. Id. at 2262 (arguing that rejecting the confederate flag design was “pure viewpoint 
discrimination,” especially because the Board approved a Buffalo Soldiers plate with a design Native 
Americans find offensive and demeaning to their group). 
 213. See, e.g., Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F.3d 571, 573 (1st 
Cir. 2015) (“Many circuits and district courts have addressed the First Amendment issues that public 
transit authority advertising policies raise.”).  
 214. Compare id. at 579–80 (upholding application of the guideline in a nonpublic forum), with 
id. at 594–95, n.8 (summarizing cases finding application of the standard in a private speech forum 
to be unconstitutional). 
 215. See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 880 F. Supp. 2d 456, 474–75 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (relying on R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)). 
 216. See, e.g., Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251–52 (majority opinion). 
 217. See id. at 2251. 
 218. Id. at 2252 (listing the types of private advertising that is tied to government property, such 
as a school district’s internal mail system, a city bus, or a charitable fundraiser directed by 
government employees). 
 219. Id. (citing Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 299 (1974)) (distinguishing the specialty 
license plate program from advertising on city buses, which a plurality found to create a nonpublic 
forum). 
 220. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2252 (distinguishing specialty license plate designs from the advertising 
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other types of government–private speech combinations that have been 
presumed to create private speech forums.221  Government entities will 
undoubtedly seize on the new prospect of classifying a program as 
government identity speech to justify viewpoint discrimination in their 
speech selections.  Hence, it is critically important to understand how the 
Walker test can be applied as an effective tool to identify the boundary 
between government–private speech combinations that are forums and those 
that produce government identity speech. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE TEST FOR GOVERNMENT IDENTITY SPEECH 
A. Situating the Walker Test 
The Walker test and the category of government identity speech 
programs are the most recent of the many tests and types produced by the 
Court to segregate and analyze restrictions on government–private speech 
combinations.  The Court’s immediate plunge into articulation and 
application of the factors of its new test in Summum,222 and again in 
Walker,223 obscures the preliminary determinations implicit in its decision to 
create the test and apply it to the programs before it.  Other entities that must 
determine whether and how to apply the Walker test must understand where 
it is situated in the broad government–private speech combination 
framework. 
The government interacts with the speech of private individuals in many 
different ways.  Little recognized, but crucial to sifting through the doctrine 
and cases, is that a basic attribute of government speech programs, 
government-curated speech programs, and created forums is that the 
government operates them, at least in part, for the purpose of adding 
 
space it had addressed years before in part on the ground that the advertising space “bore no indicia 
that the speech was owned or conveyed by the government”); Mech v. School Bd. of Palm Beach 
Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1079 (11th Cir. 2015) (applying the Walker test and finding that advertisements 
on school stadium banners constitute government speech). 
 221. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2252.  
 222. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009) (“There may be situations in 
which it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing 
a forum for private speech, but this case does not present such a situation.”). 
 223. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246 (beginning its analysis section by stating, “In our view, specialty 
license plates issued pursuant to Texas’s statutory scheme convey government speech”). 
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information or ideas to the speech market.224  Lower courts have struggled 
when trying to use government–private speech combination models to 
analyze speech restrictions imposed on access to programs that do not 
require private entities to speak or assist in the production of speech to 
achieve any of the government’s purposes.225  So, the first question when 
assessing application of the Walker test, or any other government speech or 
forum test, is whether the government is running a program that grants 
access to private speakers and whether a purpose of the program is to 
produce speech.226  Absent a plausible assertion by either party that a 
program granting access to private entities exists, and that an attribute 
necessary to fulfilling its purpose is that the private entities produce speech, 
neither the government speech nor the forum precedents apply.227 
Another preliminary determination is inherent in the Court’s decision to 
 
 224. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 469–70, 473 (holding that the government may designate forums 
typically outside of the traditional public forum, as well as programs for itself, to allow for the 
expression of ideas).  
 225. See, e.g., Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, No. 1:13-CV-1053, 2016 WL 843374, at *9 
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2016) (addressing the exclusion of a vendor from a government office lunch 
program because of its name and stating that the court “has struggled with the idea that this case 
does not neatly fit within [the forum discussion] framework”); Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the 
Public Forum Doctrine, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 647, 669–72 (2010) (noting other examples where 
courts apply forum doctrine to situations where the government is not running a program for private 
participants for the purpose of producing speech). 
 226. See generally Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2247 (showing that the first factor considered by the 
Court in its analysis regarding government speech [after its forum analysis] was whether the 
government was speaking to the public or if the forum at issue was reserved for private speech); 
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (showing that the Court must 
first decide what type of forum is at issue, keeping in mind that the government may deny access to 
some public speech in the limited public forum); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194–95 (1991) 
(showing the Court’s need to determine whether the funding program at issue was designed by the 
government to produce private speech).  
 227. This assertion goes beyond what the Court has held specifically, but follows from the Court’s 
statement that some government properties are “not fora at all.”  See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n 
v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).  So, exclusion of an audience member from a speech because 
of a bumper sticker or leafletters from welfare office waiting rooms limited to persons there on 
official business do not present government speech or forum questions because the government is 
not running a program for the purpose of producing speech.  See Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 
1169 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaining that as attendees at a president’s speech, plaintiffs were “not 
speakers at all”); Make the Rd. by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 145, 146 n.7 (2d Cir. 
2004) (classifying a welfare office waiting room as nonpublic forum, while noting that “[l]ike 
waiting rooms in airport terminals, medical clinics or doctor’s offices, or motor vehicle departments, 
welfare office waiting rooms generate casual conversations” but are otherwise not opened for 
expression).   
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create and apply the new Walker test.  This is that the attributes that define 
commissioned government speech programs and government-curated speech  
were not appropriate or sufficient in the context of the government–private 
speech combinations at issue and that, instead, it was necessary to define a 
new government speech program type.228  Although the Court did not set out 
the analysis, other entities must reason from the government’s assertion that 
it should have the discretion to discriminate among private speech applicants 
to the particular type that identifies the test the program must meet.229  With 
respect to all of the types, the need to fulfill a legitimate government 
function justifies restrictions imposed by a government on the content, 
including the viewpoints, of private speech.230  Consequently, the 
government’s asserted functional purpose for restricting the content of the 
private speaker challenging the restriction will determine the program type 
or types that may apply.231  When the government asserts that its purpose in 
combining with private speakers is to produce its own identity speech, then 
the Walker test applies to determine whether the attributes that justify 
judicial deference to the government’s content control of speech selections 
exist. 
The Walker Court began its analysis by presenting its “precedents 
regarding government speech” and its “precedents regarding forums for 
private speech” as if they constituted dichotomous “framework[s] through 
which to approach the case.”232  But this dichotomous presentation is 
misleading.  In fact, the Court created the Walker test to resolve both sides 
of a speech program’s classification, as its redundant distinctions of forum 
precedents illustrate.  Entities seeking to apply the test meaningfully and 
coherently must understand how the government speech and forum inquiries 
intersect within the test. 
To be sure, the Court has not been obvious in explicating the overlaps 
 
 228. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250–53 (distinguishing the government speech in that case from the 
modalities of the traditional forum analysis).  
 229. See id. (demonstrating that although the Court’s inquiry does not fit within the forum 
analysis, there are various ways in which it distinguished the speech as government speech, even 
though some private speech was at issue).  
 230. Id. at 2245–46, 2253 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009)). 
 231. Id. at 2248–49 (holding that the government’s purpose of using license plates as a state-
sponsored identification system warranted a restriction on private speech because the speech was 
more closely related to government speech to serve a legitimate government purpose).  
 232. Id. at 2246. 
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between government speech and forum doctrine.  But, of course, they exist.  
According to the Court, private messages accepted and displayed by the 
government “constitute government [identity] speech” when they “are meant 
to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message.”233  
Although the mention of the effect of the speech is new and will need to be 
explained, the focus on the government’s intent to classify a government 
identity speech program is the same as the created forum determination.234 
Mere reference to “government intent” in creating a speech access 
program, however, is insufficiently specific.  As noted above, the 
classification of a government speech program as a particular type depends 
upon the function to which the speech restriction relates.  So, “government 
intent,” with respect to government speech programs, means the function 
that the government intends to fulfill through the speech restriction.235  In 
fact, “government intent” as the function to which the restrictions imposed 
on private speech relate applies to created forums as well.236  That is, the 
scope of the government’s ability to discriminate among private speakers 
depends upon the relationship of the speaker access program to the 
government entity’s constitutionally mandated function in both government 
speech and forum doctrine.237  It is the government’s reason for restricting 
the content of the private expression and the role of the restriction in 
fulfilling a government function that distinguishes the two types of access 
programs.238  With government speech programs, function justifies 
affirmative discrimination among private messages because the 
government’s intent in interacting with the private speakers is to use the 
content of the private speech as the means to accomplish a function that 
requires speech.239  With created forums, function justifies some degree of 
 
 233. Id. at 2250 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 472). 
 234. See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text. 
 235. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009) (identifying the city’s intent 
with regard to the monument program as showing the area’s identity, and therefore, warranting a 
restriction on speech that conflicts with that idea).  
 236. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250 (focusing on the intent required of the government to open 
specific fora not traditionally designated as such).  
 237. See supra notes 235–36 and accompanying text.  
 238. See infra notes 239–40 and accompanying text.  
 239. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468 (“A government entity may [select the views that it wants to 
express] when it receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering a 
government-controlled message.”). 
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negative discrimination among private speakers or messages because the 
government’s intent in interacting with the private participants is to facilitate 
private speech but to avoid disruptions caused by the content.240 
This recognition of the different reasons that the Constitution permits 
governments to restrict access to government speech programs and created 
forums clarifies the specific meaning of the inquiry into government intent 
in the Walker test, or any other test that purports to distinguish government 
speech programs from created forums.241  The question of whether the 
government intends to produce government speech by means of an access 
program requires a targeted inquiry into whether the government intends its 
speech restrictions to tailor private submissions so that their content will 
impact listeners in a way that fulfills a government purpose.  The 
government’s reason for imposing the particular speech restriction at issue 
will guide the inquiry.242  If the government can only articulate a purpose to 
avoid interference with a function that does not require the government to 
speak, then its speech access program is a created forum that does not 
produce government speech.243  If the government can plausibly describe its 
speech restrictions as tailoring private speech content to influence viewers to 
perceive its own image or identity in certain, presumably positive, ways, 
then the factors set out in Walker provide the tool to “test” whether sufficient 
evidence exists to support the government’s assertion of its intent. 
In addition to the substantive determination of government intent, the 
same types of evidence are probative in making the determination across the 
range of government–private speech combinations.  To determine the extent 
to which the government intended to open a forum, the Court looks to the 
“policy and practice of the government.”244  The policy sets out the 
restrictions that the government intends to impose on access to the forum.245  
 
 240. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 807 (1985) (government 
may limit access by certain speakers to a nonpublic forum to avoid “unwelcome disruption” of the 
workplace in which the forum is situated). 
 241. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 471–72 (examining the selectivity used by government speech 
programs in the past to tailor the “allowed” speech to the government’s specific objective or idea it 
wishes to express).  
 242. Id.  
 243. Id.  
 244. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015) 
(quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802). 
 245. Id. at 2251.  
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Courts seek evidence of the government’s administration of its forum to 
confirm the boundaries in the stated policy.246  Evidence of inconsistent 
enforcement of an access restriction can contradict the government’s claim 
that it intends to limit access and change a court’s classification of the 
forum.247  The government’s access policy and practice provides relevant 
evidence across and into the forum–government identity speech program 
divide.248  The government’s asserted policy to restrict private submissions 
to create government identity speech begins the inquiry.  To apply the 
Walker test prongs, the Court looked to both the government’s stated policy 
and its practice in soliciting, evaluating, and broadcasting private 
submissions.249 
In the forum context, the Court also recites that it looks to “the nature of 
the property and its compatibility with [private] expressive activity” to 
determine the program’s classification.250  As noted above, the Court has not 
used the compatibility consideration to force the government to grant access 
to its property greater than its expressed intent.251  Rather, it has cited 
evidence about the function of the property in which a forum is placed and 
its incompatibility with a greater scope of private expression as confirming 
the government’s asserted intent to restrict access.252  The Court has used 
this type of evidence in the same way as in the government speech program 
 
 246. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 
163 F.3d 341, 352–53 (6th Cir. 1998) (looking “closely” to “examine whether in practice [the 
government] has consistently enforced its written policy in order to satisfy [itself] that [the 
government’s] stated policy represents its actual policy”). 
 247. See, e.g., Christ’s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
 248. Id. at 253.  
 249. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249 (noting rules and applications of rules that showed that Texas 
maintained “direct control over the messages conveyed”); id. at 2260–61 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(relying on the same evidence of Texas’s practice to find a lack of selective receptivity, which 
should indicate that the Texas specialty license plate is a created forum). 
 250. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
 251. Some lower courts have read the Court’s precedents to direct this type of compatibility 
inquiry.  See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099, 163 F.3d at 350 
(“Discerning whether the government permits general access to public property or limits access to a 
select few does not end our inquiry, however, for we must also assess the nature of the forum and 
whether the excluded speech is compatible with the forum’s multiple purposes.”). 
 252. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804 (“In cases where the principal function of the property would be 
disrupted by expressive activity, the Court [has been] particularly reluctant to hold that the 
government intended to designate a public forum.”). 
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inquiry.  In Summum specifically, as noted above, the Court relied upon the 
incompatibility of forum-type permanent monument access with the function 
of parks and public open spaces to support the government’s assertion that it 
intended its program to produce government speech.253  So, the fundamental 
inquiries into the government’s intent in creating and running a speech 
access program, as well as the evidence sought by the tests to classify 
particular programs, are the same across the spectrum of government–
private speech programs.  Specific inquiries, including applications of the 
Walker test, will be more coherent, consistent, and principled when 
understood in this way. 
B. Parsing the Prongs 
The purpose of the Walker test is to determine whether a speech access 
program is “meant to convey and ha[s] the effect of conveying a government 
message.”254  So, its three prongs focus on reviewing evidence of the 
government’s intent in creating and running a speech access program and the 
program’s effect on listeners.255  Evidence of intent and effect will overlap, 
because viewer perceptions will often be conditioned by intentional 
government acts.256  Nevertheless, prong two of the Walker test explicitly 
addresses viewer perception.257  The other two prongs, which ask about the 
government’s historical use of the medium and its effective control over the 
content of private submissions, can be seen primarily as an inquiry into the 
government’s intent.258  With the inevitable overlaps in mind, this Section 
will address the prongs in this way. 
Additionally, the Walker test presents the effective control inquiry as 
prong three.259  Entities applying the test will likely follow the prongs’ 
 
 253. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 479 (2009) (quoting Summum v. Pleasant 
Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2007) (McConnell, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc)) (“If government entities must maintain viewpoint neutrality in their selection of donated 
monuments, they must either ‘brace themselves for an influx of clutter’ or face the pressure to 
remove longstanding and cherished monuments.”). 
 254. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 472). 
 255. See id. at 2248. 
 256. See id. 
 257. Id. at 2247.  
 258. Id.  
 259. Id. 
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sequence.260  Prong three, however, presents the most obvious overlap with 
the tests for created forums and the other government speech program types.  
Also, its “effective control” determination is the only requirement to identify 
commissioned speech programs, which is a difference that is best understood 
before applying the other prongs.  Thus, this Section will address prong 
three first. 
1. Prong 3: Government’s Effective Control over the Message 
The third prong of the Walker test requires that the government 
“effectively control” the message sent by private speech participants.261  This 
prong is drawn directly from the commissioned government speech test and 
in that context, is the sole requirement.262  In the context of government 
identity speech, the Court has described this prong as evidenced by a 
practice of “selective receptivity.”263  The counterpart to this requirement in 
forum doctrine is that to avoid strict scrutiny of exclusions, the government 
must demonstrate an intent to grant “selective” rather than “general” 
access.264  To use this prong to distinguish policies and practices that create 
government identity speech programs from those that characterize created 
forums, it is necessary to probe and clarify the similar terminology. 
To gauge the type and degree of control over the content of speech that 
marks different types of government speech programs and created forums, it 
is necessary to recognize that the government’s apparent intent to exercise 
“control” over the content of private speech cannot alone provide a 
principled justification for it to do so.  In forum doctrine, which has had 
longer to develop, lower courts have recognized that selectivity and 
 
 260. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C. v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(applying the three-factor Walker test in sequence). 
 261. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2247 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 473 
(2009)). 
 262. Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005). 
 263. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2247 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471). 
 264. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998) (citing Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804 (1985)) (“On one hand, the government 
creates a designated public forum when it makes its property generally available to a certain class of 
speakers, as the university made its facilities generally available to student groups in Widmar.  On 
the other hand, the government does not create a designated public forum when it does no more than 
reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members must 
then, as individuals, ‘obtain permission,’ to use it.”). 
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permission requirements, standing alone, implement only the government’s 
will, which does not trace to any coherent set of constitutional values.265  
Selectivity and “by permission” requirements, when accepted as legitimate 
by the Court, are indicia of a more fundamental linkage between government 
speech content control and preservation of the property that hosts the forum 
so that it can fulfill its primary functions, which do not involve promoting 
private speech.  So, in the forum context, a government entity may acquire 
the discretion to distinguish among private speakers when it plausibly asserts 
that the restrictions that allocate access to the program that it has created are 
for the purpose of limiting negative impacts to its ability to effectively carry 
out its other, constitutionally mandated functions.266 
With government speech programs, as with created forums, a mere 
showing by the government of an intent to control the content of private 
speech it facilitates does not provide a principled basis for allowing the 
government to do so.  The Court has explicitly grounded the government’s 
ability to discriminate among private speakers when it produces government 
speech on its need to do so to carry out its constitutionally mandated 
functions.267  So, as with forums, a link between the assertion of control and 
the fulfillment of a legitimate government function provides the grounding 
for the “effective control” requirement in the context of government 
speech.268  With all types of government speech, the effective control over 
the speech content must be sufficient to transform private contributions into 
a government message.269  Nevertheless, the types differ in the extent of 
control that must be shown according to the function that the speech 
 
 265. See, e.g., N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1998).  A rule 
that focused solely on whether a speaker must obtain permission to access government property 
“would allow every designated public forum to be converted into a non-public forum the moment 
the government did what is supposed to be impermissible in a designated public forum, which is to 
exclude speech based on content.”  Id. 
 266. Post, supra note 74, at 1770–71 (explaining forum doctrine as drawing a line between realms 
of public discourse and managerial domains, where government managers can limit speech to 
promote internal objectives). 
 267. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009). 
 268. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005).  Effective control of the 
message is for the purpose of fulfilling Congress’s mandate to implement a “coordinated program” 
of promotion, “including paid advertising, to advance the image and desirability of beef and beef 
products.”  Id. at 561. 
 269. Id.  This does not apply to speech selections by government entities occupying recognized 
professional quality arbiter roles. 
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fulfills.270  In assessing the evidence of “policy and practice” necessary to 
show “effective control,” the function that justifies the particular category 
provides the guidepost.271 
As noted above, the Court originally articulated the “effective control” 
requirement in the context of commissioned speech.272  In commissioned 
speech programs, the government enlists private speakers to broadcast 
information or messages for the purpose of accomplishing policy objectives 
that are not contained in the speech itself.273  So, “effective control” means a 
type and degree of control over private speech content that the government 
could reasonably believe will be effective to ensure that the speech is 
tailored to be an effective means to achieve the objective.274  With 
commissioned speech, the government directs the content of private speech 
to achieve a result with identifiable substantive boundaries, so “effective 
control” requires evidence of some degree of content control evident in the 
government’s selection policies and confirmed by its procedures.275  With 
every government–private speech combination that the government asserts 
to produce commissioned speech, the stated objective provides a marker 
against which to assess whether the government’s policy and practice 
evidence “effective control” sufficient to qualify for the discretion that 
attaches to the category.276 
Because the use of private speech in the programs differs, “effective 
control” does not mean the same thing in the context of government identity 
speech programs.277  What sets the category of government identity speech 
 
 270. See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 
(2015) (explaining license plates were government speech because of the level of control the 
government had over them).  
 271. Id. (stating that there must be an examination of the “compatibility with expressive activity”).  
 272. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560.  
 273. Id. at 561.  
 274. Id. at 562.  The Court has determined that when the statutory mandate is to promote the 
consumption of beef products, evidence that the government “sets the overall message to be 
communicated and approves every word that is disseminated” is sufficient to show effective control.  
Id.  
 275. Id. (stating that there was control because the government approved the overall message, as 
well as each word in the end product).  
 276. Id.  This means that under minimum rationality review, some speech selections could be 
determined to be unreasonable or arbitrary.  Id. at 553 (stating that the question of whether 
something is the government’s own speech is reviewed under rational basis).  
 277. See infra notes 278–84 and accompanying text.  
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apart from commissioned speech is that the government need not articulate 
an objective that is independent of the meaning of the private speech 
submissions and against which the extent of effective control that the 
government must exercise to achieve it can be assessed.278  An acceptable 
objective for a government identity speech programs can be simply to 
“present itself and its constituency.”279  According to the Court, a 
requirement that the government attach particular meaning to private speech 
that it selects and presents “fundamentally misunderstands the way [private 
contributions to government identity speech] convey meaning.”280  As noted 
above, “effective control” means a type and degree of control over private 
speech content that the government could reasonably believe will be 
effective to ensure that the speech is tailored to achieve the objective.281  The 
lack of substance in the “image” or “identity” objective and in the content 
criteria for speech selections makes almost impossible an objective 
assessment of whether the content control exercised by the government 
effectively achieves its identity-broadcast objective.282  In Walker, for 
example, the dissent emphasized the inclusion of “[a]n even larger number 
of schools from out-of-state [than in-state]” as inconsistent with meaningful 
identity messaging.283  The Court, however, viewed the inclusion as 
consistent application of an implicit standard “celebrating the many 
educational institutions attended by its citizens” while failing to include a 
message “deriding schooling.”284 
Without a substantive standard against which to evaluate effective 
control, what is left is “selective receptivity” as a clue to control without the 
requirement that the selectivity be explained.285  One measure of selectivity 
 
 278. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2257 (2015) 
(Alito, J., dissenting).  
 279. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249 (majority opinion). 
 280. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 474 (2009); see also Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 
2251–52 (“Texas’s desire to convey numerous messages does not mean that the messages conveyed 
are not Texas’s own.”). 
 281. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.  
 282. Summum, 555 U.S. at 474 (stating messages may be interpreted in different ways by different 
observers). 
 283. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2257 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 284. Id. at 2249 (majority opinion). 
 285. Id. at 2247.  
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is the number or percentage of applications rejected.286  The Walker Court 
mentioned this type of evidence as probative of the government’s exercise of 
effective control.287  Some caution in using this type of evidence to support 
the type of effective control necessary to categorize a program as 
government identity speech makes sense.288  A history of frequent and 
consistent rejections of certain viewpoints is helpful to support a claim that 
speech selections create identity speech, but it is not necessary.289  It is 
plausible that only extreme outlier viewpoints may interfere with the identity 
message of a state as big as Texas, especially since the specific and broad 
content of the identity message need not be explained.290  Whether or not the 
state also rejected a “pro-life” plate years before does not add a significant 
amount of information to whether the state exercises effective control over 
its specialty plate program.291  Another reason for a lack of pattern of 
rejections is that significant barriers to entry may exist.292  To the extent that 
the government is effectively messaging identity through the medium, 
outliers may understand that they are not welcome and so may not apply.293  
Expense may also be a barrier.294  Thus, a tally of many rejections may 
support a finding that the government is exercising some sort of control, but 
 
 286. Id. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting) (pointing to the few number of rejections to indicate a lack 
of selectivity).  
 287. Id. at 2249 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Board and its predecessor have actively exercised this 
[review and approval] authority.  Texas asserts, and [Sons of Confederate Veterans] concedes, that 
the State has rejected at least a dozen proposed designs.”). 
 288. See id. at 2251 (showing that the analysis is not necessarily a quantitative one).  
 289. See id. 
 290. See id. at 2264–69 (showing pictures of thirty-seven different personalized license plates, 
representing a wide spectrum of political, social, and personal perspectives).  
 291. Id. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 292. See id. at 2245 (majority opinion) (indicating the approval process consists of an application, 
a period of public comment, public hearings, and a review period by the Department of Motor 
Vehicles).  
 293. See id. (showing additional rules against offensive material that may guide applicants with 
questionable material away from applying).  
 294. Monuments are expensive to produce.  See Mary Jean Dolan, Why Monuments Are 
Government Speech: The Hard Case of Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 7, 38 
(2008).  While it is true that hundreds of groups gathered the requisite signatures to support specialty 
plates, likely a number of smaller clusters of individuals were deterred by the requirement.  Cf. 
Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Free Speech and the Limits of Legislative Discretion: The Example of 
Specialty License Plates, 53 FLA. L. REV. 419, 427–28 (2001) (describing Florida’s $30,000 
application fee and 10,000 signatures requirement, which is a substantial barrier to overcome).  
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few rejections does not necessarily mean that it is failing to do so. 
Instead of a focus on rejections, inquiry into “effective control” in the 
context of identity speech must more appropriately focus on review 
procedures and imposition of identity-conforming mandates on accepted 
submissions.  The procedures must demonstrate the government’s intent to 
review and evaluate private submissions for the purpose of tailoring them 
and accepting them into the government’s broadcast of identity.295  
Therefore, the evidence of review must show policies sufficient to ensure 
that the selecting entity views, understands, and assesses the full content of 
every submission.  Otherwise, the government’s assertion that it intends to 
incorporate the private message into its identity is not plausible.  Evidence of 
deep and active review includes requirements for “design input,” “requested 
modifications,”296 levels of review, and formal approvals.297  Although the 
government’s practice cannot identify content or viewpoint selection 
inconsistencies, evidence of failure to follow review procedures consistently 
can provide a check on the government’s assertion that it exercises effective 
control of submissions.  While presentation policies and practices do not set 
substantive standards against which the reasonableness or consistency of the 
government’s content decisions can be evaluated, they nevertheless provide 
some evidence of the type and degree of control that is relevant to the 
government’s intent to convert private submissions into identity speech. 
Although these indicia of selectivity and control can provide some 
evidence of the government’s intent to transform private speech into identity 
speech, unmoored to a substantive objective they cannot provide all the 
evidence necessary to place a program into the category.298  Specifically, 
these indicia can exclude many created forums, but not all of them.  Detailed 
presentation requirements, content restrictions, and pre-publication review 
 
 295. See generally Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public–Private Speech and the Establishment Clause, 
85 TUL. L. REV. 571, 591–600 (2011) (describing the effective control theory and “the theme of 
control at different stages throughout the lifespan of a message” including the design stage, the 
“articulation stage,” and the display stage).  
 296. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009) (quoting Brief for Int’l Mun. 
Lawyers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 21, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 
555 U.S. 460 (2005) (No. 07-665)). 
 297. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249 (“The Board must approve every specialty plate design proposal 
before the design can appear on a Texas plate”). 
 298. See generally Alissa Ardito, Social Media, Administrative Agencies, and the First 
Amendment, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 301, 368–69 (2013). 
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are types of control that can also characterize created forums.299  The crucial 
distinguishing question then becomes whether the government exercises the 
control for the purpose of using the content of the private submissions to 
fulfill a democratically mandated function or to prevent disruption of one.  
Without an objective way to evaluate the relationship of the private speech 
to the function, the effective control determination cannot answer this 
question. 
The limited value of effective control in the context of identity speech 
explains why additional prongs of the Walker test are necessary.  The Court 
has determined that “effective control” is sufficient to place commissioned 
speech in the category because policies and practices that demonstrate the 
speech control to be a means to achieve a legitimate function ensure 
democratic accountability for the government’s exercise of viewpoint 
selectivity.300  Diligent citizens can discover in the law a direction created 
through legitimate democratic procedures that the government enlist private 
speakers to assist it to fulfill a valid substantive functional objective.301  
Courts can conduct minimal rational basis review to ensure that that the 
government could reasonably believe that the speech restrictions imposed 
will fulfill the substantive functional objective.302 
 
 299. CHI., ILL., CHI. TRANSIT BD. ORDINANCE 013-63 (May 8, 2013), http://www. 
transitchicago.com/assets/1/miscellaneous_documents/013-63_Advertising_Policy_and_Ordinance. 
pdf (Chicago Transit Authority advertising policy and guidelines). 
 300. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 563–64 (2005) (“Here, the beef 
advertisements are subject to political safeguards more than adequate to set them apart from private 
messages.  The program is authorized and the basic message prescribed by federal statute, and 
specific requirements for the promotions’ content are imposed by federal regulations promulgated 
after notice and comment.  The Secretary of Agriculture, a politically accountable official, oversees 
the program, appoints and dismisses the key personnel, and retains absolute veto power over the 
advertisements’ content, right down to the wording.  And Congress, of course, retains oversight 
authority, not to mention the ability to reform the program at any time.  No more is required.”). 
 301. Justices and commentators have argued that the government should be required affirmatively 
to disclose its role in creating government speech.  Id. at 578 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“It means 
nothing that Government officials control the message if that fact is never required to be made 
apparent to those who get the message, let alone if it is affirmatively concealed from them.  The 
political accountability of the officials with control is insufficient, in other words, just because those 
officials are allowed to use their control (and in fact are deliberately using it) to conceal their role 
from the voters with the power to hold them accountable.”).  The Court has rejected this 
requirement.  Cf. id. at 578 n.8 (“Notably, the Court nowhere addresses how, or even whether, the 
benefits of allowing government to mislead taxpayers by concealing its sponsorship of expression 
outweigh the additional imposition on First Amendment rights that results from it.”).  
 302. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (applying minimum rational 
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Because the functional objective of projecting “image” or “identity” 
does not have ascertainable substantive content, effective control over the 
content of private speakers does not by itself demonstrate that the control is 
actually being exercised in a way that takes it out of Free Speech Clause 
scrutiny.  More evidence is required to demonstrate that the government’s 
control over private speech is for the purpose of fulfilling the legitimate 
function of producing identity speech.  The evidence must show that the 
government could reasonably believe that the control it exercises will fulfill 
the purpose of producing identity speech.  Communication requires a 
speaker with an intent to send a message and listeners reasonably likely to 
understand that a communication from the speaker is happening.303  The 
additional prongs of the Walker test must be understood and applied to 
require this additional evidence that the government’s assertion that it 
intends to control the content of private speech to fulfill the purpose of 
producing an identity communication is rational. 
2. Prong 1: History of Government Expression via the Medium 
The first prong of the Walker test asks whether “the history of [the 
medium through which the government uses private speech]” shows that it 
“long ha[s] communicated messages from the [government].”304  To make 
some sense of this prong, it is necessary to understand the doctrinal dilemma 
that prompted the Court to create it. 
The historical inquiry began in Summum, a case that involved a demand 
to place a permanent monument in a public park, which everyone 
acknowledged to be a traditional public forum.305  The plaintiffs’ argument 
was that permanent monuments are like private speakers, with the same 
rights to enter a traditional public forum and “speak” free from viewpoint 
discrimination.306  To find the monuments to be government speech, the 
 
basis review under the due process and equal protection clauses). 
 303. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (conduct was sufficiently imbued with 
elements of a communication because the speaker had “[a]n intent to convey a particularized 
message . . . and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would 
be understood by those who viewed it”). 
 304. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248 (2015) 
(quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009)). 
 305. Summum, 555 U.S. at 464. 
 306. Id. at 473. 
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Court needed to separate the monument program from the park in which it 
took place.307  History and tradition define the contours of a traditional 
public forum, so the Court needed to demonstrate that according to history 
and tradition, permanent monuments were never part of the traditional public 
forum.308  The discussion of “ancient times” and “kings, emperors and other 
rulers”  using monuments as a means of expression met the definition of the 
traditional public forum on its own terms and accurately excised monuments 
and other structures “commissioned and financed by a government body for 
placement on public land” from the “time out of mind” commons “held in 
trust for use of the public” for assembly and private speech.309  Thus, in 
Summum, the “history” consideration served primarily as a qualification of 
the scope of the traditional public forum (open space where people gather 
and not monuments erected by the government that occupy some of the 
space), not as an affirmative demonstration that government collaboration 
with private speakers in the same medium also constitutes government 
speech.310 
In Walker, however, no one argued that the license plate medium was a 
traditional public forum to which all members of the public presumptively 
have access to speak.311  So, the historical inquiry was not necessary to 
excise the background, which the state makes available through the specialty 
license plate program, from the rest of the plate.  Instead, the only reason for 
the Court to offer the history of states using license plate backgrounds to 
send their own messages was as evidence that the messages remain properly 
classified as government speech when they are crafted by private speakers.  
That is, the history and tradition provide relevant evidence of the 
government intent to speak through the private speakers when it invites them 
to join a medium the government has previously occupied exclusively.312  
This solidifying of the “history and tradition” consideration into a prong of 
the government speech inquiry requires analysis of the work it can do to 
 
 307. Id. at 473–78. 
 308. Id. at 465–66. 
 309. Id. at 470–71. 
 310. See generally Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 
(2015). 
 311. See id. 
 312. See, e.g., id. at 471 (“We think it is fair to say that throughout our Nation’s history, the 
general government practice with respect to donated monuments has been one of selective 
receptivity.”). 
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distinguish the two sides of government intent at the intersection of 
government speech and a private speech forum. 
 The Summum Court relied on examples from “ancient times” such as 
“kings, emperors, and other rulers” erecting “statues of themselves” and 
“[t]riumphal arches, columns, and other monuments” to “remind their 
subjects of their authority and power” or to “commemorate military victories 
and sacrifices and other events of civic importance” to support its 
conclusions that the monuments are means of expression and when 
governments create them, they intend to use them to communicate.313  The 
Court then moved from a general discussion of the government’s use of 
monuments to speak through time and across different jurisdictions to 
observations about the history of use of monuments by the city government 
in the private access program at issue.314  Similarly, the Walker Court began 
its discussion by harking back to 1917, when “Arizona became the first State 
to display a graphic on its plates.”315  It provided examples of graphics and 
mottos chosen by states across the country through the last century and then 
narrowed its examples to Texas, the state whose plate designs were at issue, 
concluding that state messages, including those proposed by private 
speakers, have “appeared on Texas plates for decades.”316 
The Court’s reasoning about historical use refers to behavior of the 
particular governmental entity at issue and to behaviors of governments 
generally, across jurisdictions and over time.317  These sources provide 
evidence with differing weights.  Inferences drawn from the behavior of the 
 
 313. Id. at 471–72; see also Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2247 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 470) 
(“[W]hen a government entity arranges for the construction of a monument, it does so because it 
wishes to convey some thought or instill some feeling in those who see the structure.”).  The 
evidence relevant to intent and effect overlap significantly, because a speaker’s intentional actions 
should lead to viewer perceptions in line with the speaker’s intent.  See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248.  
Nevertheless, the Court segregated prong two as addressing effect and described the prong-one 
inquiry as primarily addressing intent.  Id.  Consequently, this discussion of prong one will refer to it 
as providing evidence of the government’s intent, with the understanding that intent often conditions 
effect.  
 314. Summum, 555 U.S. at 472 (“[I]t is clear that the monuments in Pleasant Grove’s Pioneer Park 
represent government speech.  Although many of the monuments were not designed or built by the 
City and were donated in completed form by private entities, the City decided to accept those 
donations and to display them in the Park.”). 
 315. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248.  
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 2248; Summum, 555 U.S. at 470.  
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same governmental entity are stronger than inferences from use by other 
entities, but, even as to these, it is important to look carefully at the evidence 
needed to help show that the government intends to use private speakers to 
produce identity speech, and what historical use of the medium can show.  
The Court reasoned in both Summum and Walker that historical use of a 
medium by the government provides relevant evidence of the government’s 
intent to speak through private speakers when it invites them to join a 
medium the government has previously occupied exclusively.318  But the 
government creates a private speech forum when it opens “government 
property that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum” to 
private speakers.319  The switch from exclusive government use to private 
speech forum can be very rapid, and displaces, rather than continues, a 
history of government messaging through the medium.320  In fact, the 
Summum Court noted that a permanent monument—a medium with a history 
of being used by the government for its own speech—could become a forum 
if the government opened access to “all of its residents (or all those meeting 
some other criterion).”321  And, governments can close private speech 
forums that they create.322  Thus, government intent gleaned from a changed 
access policy must be weighed against evidence about the history of the 
government’s use of the medium to discover government intent.323 
In both Summum and Walker, the Court addressed the forum-intent 
question separately, and less effectively than if it had engaged in a single, 
comprehensive intent inquiry.324  The relevant question when the 
government creates a program that includes private participants in a medium 
that it used to occupy exclusively is whether the government intends to 
continue creating government speech through private participants or to open 
 
 318. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251; Summum, 555 U.S. at 472.  
 319. Summum, 555 U.S. at 469. 
 320. Id. at 480. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (“[A] state is not 
required to indefinitely retain the open character of [a forum].”).   
 323. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 
473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)) (“And in order ‘to ascertain whether [a government] intended to designate 
a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum,’ this Court ‘has looked to 
the policy and practice of the government’ and to ‘the nature of the property and its compatibility 
with expressive activity.’”). 
 324. Id. at 2250–51; Summum, 555 U.S. at 474.  
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a forum for private speech.325  The complete prong one inquiry must ask 
how evidence of the government’s historical use of the medium impacts both 
possible answers to this question.326  Along with evidence of the 
government’s usage of the medium for identity messaging, it must also ask 
what the lack of this evidence can show.327 
In Summum and Walker, the Court relied on a positive history of 
government use of the medium to support an inference of the government’s 
intent to continue using private speakers to produce government identity 
speech.328  Several qualifications to the government’s historical use, drawn 
from the cases, identify when this inference is most justified.  The first is 
that only a history of the government using a medium for identity speech can 
support an inference of identity speech through private participants.329  In 
both Summum and Walker, the Court emphasized that the broad range of 
messages offered through the medium by the government prior to including 
private speakers were for the purpose of establishing identity.330  Use of the 
medium for some other type of government speech, such as commissioned 
speech, would not support the inference.331 
Another qualification that helps explain the Summum and Walker results 
is that the inference of an intent to continue producing identity speech is 
stronger when as the government changes its program to include private 
participants, it continues its historical use of the medium to message 
identity.332  In Summum, the city filled its park with a mix of monuments it 
had created and ones donated by private entities.333  So, too, in Walker, the 
license plate mottos recited by the Court as creating the relevant history 
continue to exist alongside plates with specialty designs.334  The continuous 
and simultaneous identity messaging by the same government entity before 
and through the private speaker program provides support for the 
 
 325. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251.  
 326. Id. at 2247. 
 327. See generally Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.  
 328. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248; Summum, 555 U.S. at 470.  
 329. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248; Summum, 555 U.S. at 470.  
 330. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248; Summum, 555 U.S. at 470.  
 331. Cf. Summum, 555 U.S. at 470 (noting the importance of the government using the medium 
for identity speech).  
 332. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2244; Summum, 555 U.S. at 461. 
 333. Summum, 555 U.S. at 461.  
 334. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2244.  
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presumption that the government intends the inclusion of private speakers to 
“add to” its own identity messaging rather than change its use of the medium 
to produce private speech.335 
Beyond positive history, the Court has implied that a negative history of 
the use of a medium for government identity speech may create an inference 
that the government does not intend to use private submissions to create 
identity speech.336  With respect to use of the medium by the same 
government entity, this inference would seem to be justified to the same 
extent and subject to the same qualifications as an inference from a positive 
history of use by the government for identity speech.  If a government entity 
has been using a particular medium to operate a created forum for private 
speech, then its intent to use the medium in that way would presumptively 
continue until it engaged in sufficient affirmative actions to signal a change 
in its intent.337 
In both Summum and Walker, the Court also relied on evidence about 
the use by governments generally of a type of medium to reach conclusions 
about the use by a particular government of private speech introduced into 
the same type of medium.338  But evidence of the use by governments 
generally of a particular type of medium for identity speech at most provides 
some evidence of the current intent of a particular government to use private 
speech in the same way. 
It is important, as well, to recognize the limits of broad generalizations 
about types of mediums.  For purposes of constitutional evaluation, 
“mediums” for government–private speech interactions do not exist in the 
abstract.339  Forums are defined by function, in the context of the type of 
government property or program within which they are located.340  The same 
is true of mediums for government speech.341  So, evaluation of the historical 
use of a medium for identity speech by the Court has included the access 
 
 335. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2244; Summum, 555 U.S. at 461.  
 336. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248.  
 337. Coleman v. Ann Arbor Transp. Auth., 904 F. Supp. 2d 670, 696 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (noting 
that “courts have never held that privately paid advertisements are government speech just because 
they are displayed on public property” and that there was no long history of the government using 
the medium to speak or effective control by the government over the content of the message). 
 338. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248; Summum, 555 U.S. at 470.  
 339. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250.  
 340. Id. 
 341. Id.  
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program in the context of the type of government property on which it takes 
place.342  Additionally, even when the historical use of the medium, in 
context, shows that it has been used by the government for identity speech, 
the Court has acknowledged that intentional action by the government can 
refute the historical evidence.343  As noted above, the Court has said that 
even a monument can be the location for either government identity speech 
or a private speech forum depending upon the structure of the particular 
access program.344  This suggests that the historical use of a medium is a 
piece of evidence that goes to the more fundamental inquiry into the 
attributes of the current access program, including its relationship to the 
function of the property in which it is situated, and what it says about the 
government’s intent in creating and running the program.345 
The Walker Court’s reference to evidence of negative historical use of a 
medium as probative of the government’s intent in granting access confirms 
that a speech medium must be narrowed to a location within a particular type 
of government property for the prong-one determination of historical use of 
the “type” of medium to provide useful evidence in particular 
applications.346  Specifically, it distinguished the medium of “advertising 
space” as having been “traditionally available for private speech” to explain 
a prior decision in which a plurality had characterized bus advertising space 
as a nonpublic forum.347  However, “advertising space” does not have a 
fixed physical existence like a monument on government property or a 
license plate design.348  It is a conclusion drawn from the attributes of an 
access program that can apply to any type of government property.349  In 
fact, the claim in Walker was that the government was effectively 
 
 342. Id. at 2248 (discussing Texas’s history of communicating via “license plate designs”); 
Summum, 555 U.S. at 472 (noting that “[g]overnment decisionmakers select the monuments that 
portray what they view as appropriate for the place in question”). 
 343. Summum, 555 U.S. at 472.  
 344. Id.  
 345. Id. at 472, 480.  While “monuments . . . are meant to convey and have the effect of 
conveying a government message,” the Court noted that “there are limited circumstances in which 
the forum doctrine might properly be applied to a permanent monument,” presenting an example of a 
town creating a monument where its residents could write someone’s name to be honored or a 
private message.  Id.  
 346. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248.  
 347. Id. at 2252. 
 348. Id.  
 349. Id. 
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distributing advertising space because the private speakers had to pay to 
participate.350  Now we know, however, that “the existence of government 
profit alone is insufficient to trigger forum analysis.”351  Forum analysis 
hinges on the government’s intent.  So, the mere fact that the government 
charges money to participate in a government–private speech transaction 
does not provide sufficient proof of an intent that the speech remain “purely 
private.”352  Nevertheless, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,353 the 
plurality hinged its decision that a transit advertising program was a 
nonpublic forum on the fact that the private speaker program was “part of 
the commercial venture.”354  In context, this meant that the government 
function that prompted the creation of the program was to provide 
transportation.355  The advertising space was “incidental” to that function, 
which meant that its purpose was to raise revenue to support the 
transportation function.356  The value of the speech to the government 
function came from its money-generating capacity, not from a link between 
the content of the speech and fulfillment of the government function.357  So, 
the “advertising space”358 referenced by the Walker Court as being 
“traditionally available for private speech”359 is a speech access program that 
is similarly “part of the commercial venture”360—or at least incidental to a 
government function in the sense that its purpose is to raise money to 
support the government function—as opposed to integral to a government 
function in that its content affirmatively furthers a government objective.361 
 
 350. Id. at 2262 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that specialty license plates are “little mobile 
billboards” offered for sale by the state programs “because they bring in money”). 
 351. Id. at 2252 (majority opinion). 
 352. Id. at 2250. 
 353. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).  
 354. Id. at 303. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id.  
 357. Id. at 304.  
 358. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2252 (2015).  
 359. Id.; Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303.  
 360. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303.  
 361. This is a factual judgment on which the Walker majority and dissent disagreed.  Compare 
Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2252 (“[W]e think it sufficiently clear that Texas is speaking through its 
specialty license plate designs, such that the existence of annual fees does not convince us that the 
specialty plats are a nonpublic forum.”), with Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2261–62 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(“States have not adopted specialty license plate programs like Texas’s because they are now 
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In sum, the genesis of the historical use inquiry in a particular context, 
and its limited utility when generalized as an attribute of government–
private speech combinations that produce identity speech, confirms that it is 
but one piece of evidence that must be augmented by evidence relevant to 
prongs two and three to classify a particular government–private speech 
combination.362 
3. Prong 2: Viewer Perception of Speaker Identity 
In both Summum and Walker, the Court found it important that 
observers of the private contributions to identity speech “appreciate the 
identity of the [government] speaker.”363  This is a new development.  The 
Court has not interpreted this viewer-perception requirement to apply to 
commissioned government speech.364  As noted above, the requirement that 
viewers are reasonably likely to perceive that the government is speaking 
through the private speech submissions is particularly necessary in the 
context of identity speech programs to ground the broad discretion that the 
government may exercise in selecting speech.365  Specifically, the viewer-
perception requirement acts as a check on the government’s potentially self-
serving assertion that it intends to control the speech content to serve the 
 
bursting with things they want to say” but because the programs “bring[] in many millions of dollars 
every year.”).  
 362. Walker, 135. S. Ct. at 2247 (majority opinion). 
 363. Id.; Summum, 555 U.S. at 471. 
 364. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 564 n.7 (2005).  In the context of a claim of 
forced subsidization of speech,  
the correct focus is not on whether the ads’ audience realizes the Government is 
speaking, but on the compelled assessment’s purported interference with respondents’ 
First Amendment rights.  As we hold today, respondents enjoy no right not to fund 
government speech—whether by broad-based taxes or targeted assessments, and whether 
or not the reasonable viewer would identify the speech as the government’s, 
so long as viewers would not identify the speech as the message of the individual paying the subsidy.  
Id.; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199–200 (1991).  A number of commentators have 
urged the Court to require transparency as a condition to allowing government entities to gain the 
protection of the government speech category.  See, e.g., Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, 
Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 899 (2010) (arguing that government entities should 
be required to disclose their identities to be able to claim private submissions on websites to be 
government speech). 
 365. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.  
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valid purpose of producing government identity speech.366  As with any 
action, the government’s assertion that its means will serve its end must at 
least be rational.  Combined with adequate evidence that the government 
intends to transform private submissions into identity speech, the viewer-
perception requirement ensures that the government could rationally believe 
that the communication it intends will effectively be made. 
To apply this prong, it is also important to clarify precisely what viewers 
must likely perceive with respect to the source of the speech to appreciate 
that the government is speaking.  The common understanding, and the one 
applied by the Walker dissent, is that viewers perceive a message to have a 
single source.367  But the Walker Court revealed that it was applying a 
different concept when it distinguished speech from created forums as 
“purely private.”368  After Walker, it is clear that mixed-source messages can 
be government identity speech.  In fact, fused identity statements, meaning 
statements that convey individual and group identity simultaneously, may 
best describe the product of government identity speech programs.369  
Certainly, this concept helps explain how the Walker Court could describe 
the hundreds of privately proposed messages on Texas specialty plates, 
almost all of which the government accepts and publishes without altering 
their content one bit, as “conveyed on behalf of the government.”370  In one 
sense, this concept of government identity speech as including messages that 
viewers will perceive as privately generated expands the government’s 
power to suppress speech it finds displeasing.371  In another sense, however, 
the concept of a fused identity statement as the product of legitimate identity 
speech programs, combined with the viewer perception prong of the Walker 
test, may significantly limit the circumstances under which the government 
 
 366. Cf. Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 86 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The [government’s] 
mere recitation of viewpoint-neutral rationales (or the presentation of a viewpoint-neutral guideline) 
. . . does not immunize [its] decisions from scrutiny.  The recitation of viewpoint-neutral grounds 
may be a mere pretext for an invidious motive. . . . In practical terms, the government rarely flatly 
admits it is engaging in viewpoint discrimination.”). 
 367. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting) (suggesting that to appreciate the identity of 
the government speaker, a viewer must perceive license plate designs as the “views of [the state] and 
not those of the owners of the cars”). 
 368. Id. at 2250 (majority opinion). 
 369. Id. (through specialty license plate designs, Texas “present[s] itself and its constituency”). 
 370. Id. at 2250. 
 371. Id. at 2254. 
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may reasonably intend to use private submissions to broadcast its own 
identity. 
With this reason why viewer perception is a part of the government 
identity speech test in mind and the concept of a fused identity as the 
message that the government must intend to send, it is possible to identify 
what types of evidence can be relevant indicators of what viewers perceive.  
As noted above, visible expressions of government intent to speak through 
private speakers may condition viewer perception.372  So, evidence 
particularly relevant to prongs one and three may be relevant in the prong 
two inquiry as well.  In fact, most of the types of evidence listed by the 
Court as relevant to prong two are expressions of government intent to 
control, own, and integrate itself with the content of the private speech.  
With the interrelationship of intent and effect in mind, this Section will 
discuss the types of evidence deemed relevant by the Court to show viewer 
perception of the government’s intent to speak through private submissions. 
The inquiry into viewer perception resembles the Establishment Clause 
endorsement test,373 which is notoriously indeterminate.374  A relevant 
difference, however, exists.  The endorsement test requires a court to 
determine both whom a reasonable viewer will perceive as speaking and 
what meaning the viewer will attach to particular words or images, alone or 
in combination, in the context of where they appear.375  The prong-two 
inquiry asks only the first question, as a guide to determine whether the 
Constitution permits the government to exercise the discretion to select 
private speech according to its own determination of what viewers may 
perceive its message to be.376  The inquiry into viewers’ perceptions of 
 
 372. See supra note 363 and accompanying text.  
 373. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The 
Establishment Clause prohibits . . . government endorsement . . . of religion.  Endorsement sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.”). 
 374. See Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 
(1989), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (resulting in opinions 
that reach different conclusions about how viewers will perceive a lone crèche and a menorah 
situated with other holiday symbols); Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and 
Desirability, 18 J. L. & POL. 499, 510–35 (2002) (reviewing the shortcomings of the endorsement 
test, including academic criticisms). 
 375. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690. 
 376. See infra notes 377–93 and accompanying text.  
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speaker identity certainly requires judgment, but, supplemented by the 
inquiry in government intent, can be more determinate than an inquiry into 
how viewers perceive the meaning of speech.  In fact, the particular indicia 
of viewer perception of speaker identity offered by the Court can lend a fair 
amount of objectivity and predictability to the prong-two inquiry. 
To determine viewer perception, the Court considered a number of 
different types of evidence.377  In Summum, the Court found public parks to 
be “often closely identified in the public mind with the government unit that 
owns [them.]”378  According to the Walker Court, license plate designs are 
what are closely identified in the public mind with the state, because of the 
type of property on which they appear.379  The fact that the Court mixed 
references in the two cases—to the property that hosts the program and to 
the speech that appears on it—is revealing.380  Public parks are traditional 
public forums.381  Much of the speech that occurs on them is “purely 
private” despite the close association of the property with the government in 
the public mind.382  License plates are “government articles,” which serve 
the official purposes of vehicle registration and identification.383  But official 
government property, such as government buildings, and government 
articles that serve recognized government functions, such as a government 
agency’s website, can host created speech forums.384  And, pieces of 
government property that do not serve “official” purposes, such as train 
stations, may still be closely identified in the public mind with the 
government entity that owns it, so that viewers perceive monuments, 
designs, or other features displayed in them as expressing the government 
entity’s identity. 385 
 
 377. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009). 
 378. Id. 
 379. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248 (2015).  
 380. See infra notes 381–85 and accompanying text. 
 381. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 464.  
 382. Id. at 469.  
 383. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248. 
 384. City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 174–
76 (1976) (school board meeting is a public forum); Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 
834, 844 (6th Cir. 2000) (city’s internet homepage is a nonpublic forum); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. 
Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir. 1996) (police department bulletin board is a nonpublic forum). 
 385. Brigham Yen, Ideas for Downtown LA: Using Grand Central Terminal NYC as a Model for 
LA Union Station, DTLA RISING (Jan. 14, 2013), http://brighamyen.com/2013/01/14/ideas-for-
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These observations reveal that the inherent attributes of types of 
government property do not alone condition viewers to attribute speech on it 
to the government.  Instead, it is the combination of the obvious identity of 
the owner of the property and the apparent interrelationship of the property 
owner with the privately contributed expression that appears on it that causes 
viewers to perceive the owner to be a source of the expression.  Sufficient 
evidence to meet the prong-two viewer-perception requirement thus must 
relate to both parts of the combination. 
As to the government property, evidence must show that it is “closely 
associated” in the public mind with its owner.386  In Summum, the Court 
suggested that the ownership of public parks is inherently obvious.387  
Almost always, however, public owners brand the parks they operate with a 
name that signals their ownership, which viewers see when they use the 
property.  In addition to citing the “official” nature of license plates, the 
Walker Court emphasized that Texas stamps its name on license plates, as do 
most other states.388  Certainly, the mix of inherent qualities and affirmative 
government acts of identification will vary according to the particular 
property or program.  What can be said, however, is that absent obvious and 
inherent qualities that associate the property or program with a particular 
government entity, prong two requires evidence showing affirmative 
government actions apparent to viewers acknowledging ownership of the 
property or program through which an identity speech program operates by 
the particular government entity doing the messaging.389 
The other part of the combination is the apparent interrelationship of the 
private speech with the property or program that is “closely associated” with 
the government’s identity.  Because such properties or programs can be 
places for either government identity speech or created forums, the apparent 
interrelationship must distinguish the two types of access programs.  The 
Summum Court relied on the fact that monuments are permanent.390  License 
 
downtown-la-using-grand-central-terminal-nyc-as-a-model-for-los-angeles-union-station/ (“The 
beautiful opal-faced, brass clock that sits in the middle of Grand Central Terminal is now the 
station’s official logo and brand in a smart marketing move to give the station a stronger identity.”). 
 386. Summum, 555 U.S. at 472. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248. 
 389. See supra notes 387–88 and accompanying text. 
 390. Summum, 555 U.S. at 478 (“[P]ublic parks can accommodate only a limited number of 
permanent monuments.”). 
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plate designs can disappear more easily.  Still, the designs are permanent on 
the particular plates on which they appear.  The Walker Court recited that 
the state participates in the process of fusing identities by stamping both the 
state name and the privately proposed design into property it mandates be 
displayed publicly.391  Both Courts also noted that each government took 
legal ownership of the private speech after making the decision to display 
it.392 
The Court’s emphasis on the apparent permanence or embeddedness of 
private speech in public property is helpful.  Park monuments, license plate 
designs, and a feature such as the Grand Central Station clock are the same 
in that they appear to viewers as expressive fixtures, attached to property 
obviously owned and operated by the government.  Viewers identify 
property with its owner and hold the owner responsible for how it appears 
and functions, and, when expressive fixtures appear on it, for what the 
expressive fixtures say.  The Court also analogized viewer perceptions of the 
government’s identity as speaker to behaviors of private individuals in 
accepting and displaying speech.393  Expressive fixtures on government 
property have their counterpart in expressive features that private individuals 
agree to display in public on their bodies.394  Private individuals’ willingness 
to wear the speech of another on their bodies is usually reasonably perceived 
by viewers as an intermingling that signals a merging of identity 
messages.395  Insignia or slogans on clothing or tattoos appear as an intimate 
merger, with the participation of both parties obvious in a single visual 
impression.396  The intimacy may appear lopsided, as when fans purchase 
clothing with team colors and logos, or when consumers purchase apparel 
 
 391. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248.  
 392. Id.; Summum, 555 U.S. at 472.  
 393. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249.  The Summum Court noted that private owners generally do 
not “open up their property for the installation of permanent monuments that convey a message with 
which they do not wish to be associated.”  Summum, 555 U.S. at 471.  In Walker, the Court repeated 
this language to make the same point about “issuers of ID.”  135 S. Ct. at 2249. 
 394. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (black armbands are 
expressive). 
 395. John A. Fortunato, Sponsorship Implications of the Lance Armstrong v. USPS Lawsuit, 3 
BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 72, 76 (2014) (stating that a shared image between a sponsor and a 
sponsee can help achieve brand association).  
 396. Id.  
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with commercial product insignias.397  Often, however, it may appear more 
balanced, as in the instances of commercial sponsorship of individual 
athletes or teams.398  The individual athlete, by wearing apparel with the 
insignia, broadcasts intermingling with the brand.399  Commercial sponsors 
consider their identities to be intertwined with the actions and speech of the 
athletes they sponsor, and viewers perceive the speech this way.400  Although 
the private analogy is not precise, it provides guidance as to the type of 
interrelationship between the government and private speech that must exist 
for viewers to perceive a shared identity.401  For private submissions to be 
perceived on government property or in programs as expressive fixtures, 
they must appear like insignia, tattoos, or hairstyles on individuals, more 
deeply embedded in the property or united with the government’s own 
expressions of identity than transitory forum speakers.402 
Private combinations that the Court has found to be expressive 
associations provide another type of example of private entities crafting and 
broadcasting identity speech through private submissions.403  Parades are 
expressive associations, as are certain types of membership organizations 
that broadcast commonly crafted speech publicly.404  In these types of 
private expressive combinations, the private submission need not appear as 
 
 397. See, e.g., Eben Novy-Williams, NFL Teams Split $7.3 Billion in Revenue, Packers Numbers 
Reveal, BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-
20/nfl-teams-split-7-3-billion-in-revenue-packers-numbers-reveal (announcing $7.3 billion in 
revenue for the National Football League due in large part to licensing and merchandise sales).  
 398. See, e.g., Emmett Knowlton, Lebron James’ Business Partner Confirms Lifetime Deal with 
Nike is Worth Over $1 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (May 17, 2016, 2:16 PM), http://www. 
businessinsider.com/lebron-james-nike-deal-exceeds-1-billion-maverick-carter-says-2016-5.  
 399. See Fortunato, supra note 395.  
 400. See, e.g., Athletes Who’ve Lost Endorsements After Scandals, CBS NEWS (Oct. 23, 2012, 
12:39 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/media/athletes-whove-lost-endorsements-after-scandals/ 
(listing examples of athletes who lost lucrative sponsorships after behavior scandals). 
 401. See Fortunato, supra note 395, at 79.  
 402. Id. (explaining that a successful sponsorship must go beyond “stick[ing] a badge or logo onto 
something”).  
 403. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (stating that the courts have “long 
understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a 
corresponding right to associate with others in a pursuit of a wide variety of a political, social, 
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends”).  
 404. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (Boy Scouts are an expressive 
association); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995). 
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fixtures to send a message of merged identity.405  Instead, the obvious 
appearance of individuals as units within an expressive group signals the 
intermingling of identity.406  Parades appear publicly as a single visual 
grouping, so viewers can perceive the common speech net that binds the 
various speech contributions of the participants.407  The members of 
expressive organizations may appear together publicly as assembled 
physically or on lists, and in this way present a single visual image to link 
their identities.408  Often, however, they may appear in public individually.409  
In such instances, a message of expressive association may emanate from 
the individual through identity-conforming messaging, such as uniforms, 
colored clothing, or insignia.410 
As with expressive fixtures, the private expressive association analogy 
provides guidance as to the affirmative steps the government must take to 
bind multiple private submissions together in a way that will be perceived by 
viewers as government identity speech.  Of course, the government can host 
a parade.  If the private submissions are not, however, viewed together as a 
branded grouping, the government must brand the units individually.411  The 
indicia of expressive association will be manifestations of the identity-
conforming mandates that show effective control over the presentation of 
private submissions.412  License plate designs stake out the current border 
between combinations that present sufficient indicia of expressive 
association to produce government speech and those where the degree of 
 
 405. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568 (stating that there is an “inherent expressiveness [in] marching to 
make a point”).  
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. at 569 (explaining the expressive nature of marches and parades).  
 408. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 653 (noting that because the scout leader was “one of a group of gay 
Scouts who ha[d] become leaders in their community and [we]re open and honest about their sexual 
orientation,” his “presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to send 
a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual 
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior”). 
 409. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 (observing that the very purpose of marching was to show 
solidarity with other such individuals in the community).  
 410. See Fortunato, supra note 395. 
 411. Cf. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576 (holding that most parades will be a form of expressive 
association due in part to the fact that they do not consist of “individual, unrelated segments that 
happen to be transmitted together for individual selection by members of the audience”).  
 412. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that a newspaper 
was entitled to First Amendment protections because the decision of what goes into the newspaper 
constitutes “the exercise of editorial control and judgment”).  
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interaction means that the program is a created forum.413  While it is true that 
specialty license plate programs bear multiple indicia of forums, the 
manifestations of identity-conforming mandates meaningfully sets them 
apart from programs that the Court has found to be forums.414  Each plate is 
“official” and is also branded with the state names, so the government as the 
property “owner” is obvious.415  In line with the private behavior analogy, 
plate designs appear as expressive fixtures.416  The state accepts the design 
proposals and then through its own actions, stamps the designs permanently 
onto the official plates, like a tattoo or piercing.417  The plate designs also 
bear some indicia of identity-conforming mandates appearing in public as 
units in an expressive association.418  The plates are a uniform size, the 
designs are similarly formatted, all appear beneath the alpha-numeric 
sequence that performs the official function of the plate, and the common 
“TEXAS” branding, which appears in the same way on every plate, 
segregates the state plates from other plates branded with other state names, 
creating an impression of individual units in a common grouping or 
“parade.”419  New programs will present different combinations of branding 
and indicia of identity-conforming mandates.  The Texas specialty license 
plate program presents a strong guidepost against which the extent of 
branding and conforming mandates must be assessed.420 
In assessing the attributes necessary for a private submission to appear 
as an expressive fixture or a part of an expressive association on government 
property or in a program, it is helpful to compare how private submissions 
appear in programs the Court has characterized as forums.  Groups that use 
space to meet,421 pieces that travel through a workplace mail system,422 
 
 413. See discussion supra Section I.D.2.a. 
 414. See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2251 
(2015). 
 415. See generally id. 
 416. Id. at 2250. 
 417. Id.  
 418. Id.  
 419. Jess Stoner, IH8YRST8, MORNING NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.themorning 
news.org/article/ih8yrst8 (describing “license plate prejudice” based on association of driver with the 
state on the plate). 
 420. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251. 
 421. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 117–18 (2001); Widmar v. Vincent, 
454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981) (holding that a religious, open forum at a public university is only 
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individuals distributing leaflets to passersby,423 and candidates in televised 
debates424 appear on government property only briefly or intermittently.  No 
government branding of individual participants or indicia of government 
review and tailoring of the submissions to a common presentation format is 
apparent.425  A comparison makes the point as well.  When the post office 
allows private groups to distribute literature and speak to patrons on the 
sidewalk area leading into its building, it creates a forum for private 
speech.426  The groups appear haphazardly with no indicia of government 
identity branding other than their presence on the property.427  By contrast, 
private submissions that appear on postage stamps are accepted by the 
government and through its own processes stamped onto an official item, the 
submissions appear under the name of the government, and in uniform size 
and presentation, and they endure for months or years.428  Thus the 
submissions that appear on postage stamps, like license plate designs, appear 
both as expressive fixtures and as units in an expressive association, in ways 
that meaningfully distinguish the program from forums for private speech.429 
A final determination implicit to finding that viewers perceive private 
submissions as government identity speech, and which overlaps with the 
inquiry into government intent, is that the government appears to be running 
the program for this purpose.430  A complicating consideration, relevant to 
viewer perception and present in both Summum and Walker, is that the 
government may have the additional purpose of saving or making money 
when it accepts private submissions for what it claims is identity speech.431  
The Walker Court touched on the relevance of a financial motive by the 
 
“incidental”).  
 422. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).   
 423. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736–37 (1990). 
 424. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998). 
 425. See supra notes 421–24 and accompanying text.  
 426. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 738. 
 427. See Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 537 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[N]o one can reasonably 
interpret a private group’s rally or press conference as reflecting the government’s views simply 
because it occurs on public property.”). 
 428. See generally Kevin R. Kosar, Cong. Research Serv., RS22611, Common Questions About 
Postage and Stamps (2013). 
 429. Id.  
 430. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2249 (2015). 
 431. See id. at 2255–56 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
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government, holding that the government may make a profit from private 
submissions but still be using them to create identity speech.432  It also said 
that “advertising space” has traditionally produced private rather than 
government identity speech.433  So, at some point, an apparent government 
intent to make money from the sale of space overwhelms any assertion by 
the government that it is using the private submissions to produce identity 
speech.434  As noted above, the indicia of effective control can be the same 
with identity speech programs and advertising forums, and historical usage 
cannot meaningfully distinguish the status of money-making programs.435  
So, it is the prong-two viewer perception inquiry that must make this 
distinction. 
Once again, an analogy to the behavior of private speech sponsors and 
recipients can provide guidance as to when a money-making purpose is 
consistent with the intent and effect of conveying a government identity 
message.  It is tempting to say that when money is the primary motivation 
for the government to enter into a speech combination, then it cannot 
broadcast identity speech.  But this conclusion is too strong when assessed 
against the instances where private individuals can be motivated to make 
money but still convey identity speech.436  In fact, instances of financial 
sponsorship of government operations—akin to private commercial 
sponsorships—present strong financial motivation on the part of both the 
government and the sponsor along with visible intermingling of the 
government and sponsor identities.437  A corporate name on a government 
operation presents in the same way as a corporate logo on an athlete’s cap or 
shoulder.  The government’s apparent intent is like the athlete’s: both want 
to make money, not to speak.  But both nevertheless broadcast the content of 
the private submission as a means to their end.  And prong two of the 
 
 432. Id. at 2252 (majority opinion) (“The existence of government profit alone is insufficient to 
trigger forum analysis.”). 
 433. Id.  
 434. Id. 
 435. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.  
 436. See Why Sponsor Sponsorship Benefits & Event Sponsorship Benefits, MOREBUSINESS.COM 
(July 16, 2007), http://www.morebusiness.com/running_your_business/marketing/Sponsorship-
Marketing.brc (discussing the benefits of sponsorship to companies).  
 437. Id. (“Given the propensity of consumers to associate sponsors with the event they promote, it 
is important for companies to select events that are appropriate with their product or corporate 
image.”). 
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Walker test asks whether viewers perceive the entity who has agreed to 
broadcast the private message for the purpose of making money nevertheless 
to be speaking on its own behalf.438  The Walker Court observed that 
specialty plate design sponsors pay for space because of the merger between 
their message and the government’s that they believe viewers will 
perceive.439  The same is true of corporate sponsors of teams and athletes.  In 
both instances, the sponsor is the one motivated to broadcast a merged 
identity, while the speaker does it as a means to fulfilling the function of 
providing financial support for its operations.  While the money-making end 
is the same, the means of broadcasting a merged identity is different from 
the means of selling only advertising space.  Even though the government is 
motivated to make money, it intends to broadcast a merged identity and, so 
long as viewers are likely to perceive it, the requirements of accountability 
to the electorate and minimal judicial means–end review of the government 
action are met.440 
The line between sponsorship that creates an identity message and 
advertising that remains purely private is not bright and will have to be 
drawn according to criteria in addition to the government’s primary money-
making motive.441  Many of these features of merger are identified above.  
With respect to sponsorships particularly, features of particular relevance are 
practices that are obvious to viewers and suggest that the government is 
mitigating its financial motive with requirements that conform the speech so 
that it is an acceptable addition to the government’s identity.442  These types 
of practices include restrictions on word count; uniform or limited color, 
typeface, or size options; rules that forbid certain types of messaging such as 
urging action or listing price; formats such as those common on public radio 
whereby announcers read the copy and merchants have the option of 
 
 438. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
 439. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2249 (2015). 
 440. Id. at 2252. 
 441. Id. 
 442. See generally Jason Bradley Kay, What Is a Good Name Worth? Local Government 
Sponsorships and the First Amendment, POPULAR GOV’T, Fall 2003, at 31, http://sogpubs. 
unc.edu/electronicversions/pg/pgfal03/article4.pdf (discussing the government’s ability to 
“encourage some sponsorships and discourage others,” which “allows a local government to 
generate revenue and community involvement through beneficial sponsorships while avoiding the 
problems that can result from associating with a sponsor that does not espouse the values and beliefs 
of the citizenry.”). 
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“underwriting” the production of particular programming;443 identification of 
“donors” as “sponsors” or “partners” without additional persuasive 
messaging;444 and exclusive or extensive sponsorships of structures or 
events.445 
C. Summary of Inquiry 
The flowchart below summarizes the inquiry into whether a 




 443. Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1087 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(upholding public radio station’s refusal to accept “underwriting” of its “All Things Considered” 
program). 
 444. Wells v. City & Cty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding sign thanking 
“sponsors” was speech by the city and not the private sponsors).  
 445. Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s Perfect Storm, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 6–9 (2007) (describing the “growth of school house commercialism”); Corporate 
Sponsorship, CHI. HIST. MUSEUM, https://www.chicagohistory.org/join-support/sponsorship/ (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2017) (“Sponsorship of public programs, educational programs, exhibitions and events 
at the Chicago History Museum offers creative and cost-effective strategies to meet corporate 
objectives.  As a Sponsor, you can strengthen and enhance visibility of your brand in [a number of] 
ways.”). 
 446. See infra Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Government Identity Speech Analysis Flowchart 
 
Government Identity Speech Analysis Flowchart 
Government Action Restricts Private Speech 
Has the Government Imposed the Restriction in the Course of Administering a Government–
Private Combination that Requires Speech Dissemination to Fulfill the Combination’s 
Purpose? 
Yes No Other Free Speech 
Rules Apply 
What Is the Government’s Purpose for Imposing the Challenged Speech Restriction? 
To Adjust the Content of Private Speech to 
Conform It to a Government Message, 
Which Fulfills the Purpose of the Program 
To Adjust the Content of the Private 
Speech so it Does Not Disrupt a 
Government Function Outside the Purpose 
of the Program 
Consider Private Speech Forum Types 
Consider Government Speech & 
Speech Selection Program Types 
How Does the Government Use the Content of Private Speech? 
Curates and Presents 
Private Speech of 
Appropriate Quality 
and Relevance to Its 
Role 
Commissions Private 
Speech Assistance as a 
Means to Accomplish 
Functional Objectives 
Reviews, Conforms 
and Fuses Private 
Speech into a 
Government Identity 
Message 
Walker Test: Does the Government Intend to Use the Content of Private Submissions to 
Broadcast Its Own Identity and Could It Reasonably Believe that the Broadcast Will Have 
that Effect? 
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Prong One: Historical Use of the Medium Supports an Inference of the Government’s 
Current Intent to Message Identity Through Private Submissions: Inference is 
Stronger if  
• History Relates to the Particular Government Entity 
• History Is of Sending Identity Messages Through the Medium 
• Government Continues Simultaneously to Message Identity with Private 
Participants 
Prong Two: Viewers Likely Perceive the Government Identity Message Through 
Private Submissions; Factors: 
• Government Ownership of Property or Program Is Obvious 
Ø Via Nature of Property  
Ø Via Affirmative Government Branding 
• Private Speech Appears as 
Ø Expressive Fixture or Unit  
Ø In Expressive Association 
Prong Three: Government Exercises Control over Speech Submissions Effective to 
Fuse Them into Its Own Identity Message 
• Procedures Must Show 
Ø Deep and Active Review of Speech Content 
Ø Imposition of Identity-Conforming Mandates 
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A.  Vanity Plates 
Through vanity plates programs, states allow drivers to choose letter–
number combinations for the purpose of sending a message.447  This means 
that a vanity plate program is either a government speech program or a 
created forum.  States are not able to claim that they are commissioning the 
private speech that appears on vanity plates as a means to achieve a 
functional objective that requires tailoring the content of the speech.  They 
do not occupy the role of a quality curator or editor, selecting speech 
according to accepted, professional standards.448  States are unable to 
articulate a function that requires tailoring the content of private speech 
other than to broadcast image or identity.449  Thus, the Walker test must be 
applied to determine whether, in selecting and broadcasting private speech, 
the government intends to fulfill its legitimate function of broadcasting its 
own image and identity, and whether the communication has that effect. 
The core difference between vanity and specialty license plates is with 
respect to prong one.450  States have not historically used the letter–number 
sequence for identity messaging.451  Rather, this part of the license plate has 
always served the nonexpressive function of identifying vehicles.452  Under 
vanity plate programs, it serves this same, nonexpressive function for the 
government even as it conveys unique messages chosen by the vehicle 
owners.453  These facts create a negative history of government identity 
messaging through the medium: the medium existed prior to the private 
participation program without government identity messaging and, in the 
new program, the government does not simultaneously identity message.  
The negative history exists both as to a specific program at issue in litigation 
and, generally, across states and through the years the programs have 
 
 447. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2244 (2015). 
 448. See id.  
 449. See id. 
 450. See id. at 2248.  
 451. See id. 
 452. See id. 
 453. See id. at 2244. 
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operated.  This negative history creates some evidence that the particular 
state at issue does not intend to use private participants to send identity 
messages and that viewers will expect that the vanity messages are private. 
With respect to prong two, however, the same evidence that the private 
speech is an expressive fixture and appears as an expressive association 
exists with vanity plate and specialty plate expression.454  The government’s 
“ownership” of the license plate and its official function are clear to viewers 
through its inherent qualities and the affirmative acts of branding the plate 
with the state’s name.455  The private speech appears in the same intimate, 
embedded, and stamped-on way as the specialty designs.456  For the same 
reason that they are subject to uniform size, format, text-length, and style of 
messaging, viewers will likely understand the fusing of individual unit and 
group identity to the same extent that they understand it with specialty plate 
designs.  A possible distinction is that each vanity plate message is unique 
and represents the expression of a single driver rather than a group.457  
According to the Court’s instructions, however, the number of private 
submissions is not as significant to gauging viewer perception of the source 
of speech as the relationship between the government property and the 
private speech.458  For all of the reasons listed above, the relationship in the 
context of vanity and specialty plates is best viewed as the same. 
Similarly, states’ “effective control” over vanity configurations is 
generally of the same type and degree as with specialty designs.459  State 
agencies impose “prior submission requirements” and exercise “selective 
receptivity” to proposed configurations, permitting most, rejecting some, and 
recalling a few of them if some objectionable messages slip past the initial 
 
 454. See id. at 2248–49.  
 455. See id. at 2242.  
 456.  See id. at 2248–49.  
 457. See, e.g., Matwyuk v. Johnson, 22 F. Supp. 3d 812, 823–24 (W.D. Mich. 2014). 
 458. Mitchell v. Md. Motor Vehicle Admin., 126 A.3d 165, 185–86 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015).  
While it is true that states may not intend to send messages such as “BOB” or “FROSTY,” and 
viewers will perceive that the messages were chosen by the drivers and not by the state, the 
government’s specific embrace of individual messages simply is not necessary when the government 
is identity messaging.  Id.  
 459. See Comm’r of Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Vawter, 45 N.E.3d 1200, 1206 (Ind. 2015).  
State programs will differ, and if a state fails to demonstrate deep and active review of submissions, 
either prior to accepting them or in response to complaints, then this crucial prong of the Walker test 
is not met. 
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review.460  Even though “written criteria” usually exist, they are often vague 
and leave room for viewpoint discrimination in the selection process.461  
While this discretion to discriminate according to the viewpoints expressed 
in the proposed messages might be fatal in a forum, it supports the 
government’s claim that its choices are for the purpose of sending a message 
“present[ing] itself and its constituency.”462  Most important, however, is 
that with vanity configurations, as with specialty designs, the crucial aspect 
that allows the government to claim an intent to identity message through 
private participants exists.  This is that the state agencies review every part 
of every letter–number configuration for the purpose of understanding the 
proposed message in its entirety before exercising “final approval 
authority.”463  In this way, the states provide evidence that they are 
exercising judgment over the proposals for the purpose of presenting image 
or identity. 
B. Trademarks 
The purpose of a trademark is to identify and distinguish the source of 
the goods or services to which it attaches.464  Trademark owners may obtain 
legal rights by using a mark in commerce without registering it through the 
federal system.465  Trademark registry, however, confers additional rights.466  
Marks approved through the federal trademark registration program are 
published in the Official Gazette of the Patent and Trademark Office and its 
 
 460. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009); Walker v. Tex. Div. Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2247 (2015). 
 461. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2256 (Alito, J., dissenting) (finding “blatant” viewpoint 
discrimination when the State rejected a specialty plate configuration just because many citizens 
may find it offensive).  
 462. Id. at 2249 (majority opinion). 
 463. Id. at 2247. 
 464. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 453 (E.D. Va. 2015) (quoting Two 
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)) (“A trademark is ‘any word, name, 
symbol, or device or any combination thereof used by any person to identify and distinguish his or 
her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the 
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.’”). 
 465. See id. at 453–54.  
 466. Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 454 (quoting B & B Hardware, Inc., v. Hargis Indus., 
135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300 (2015)) (“The Lanham Act confers important legal rights and benefits on 
trademark owners who register their marks.”). 
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Principal Register.467  Trademark holders receive a certificate of registration 
and receive the right to place the “®” symbol on the mark.468 
Courts addressing whether the federal trademark program produces 
government speech have focused on the appearance of the marks in the 
trademark registry, not on the mark-holder’s use of the trademark.469  For a 
complete inquiry, it is best to look at the medium of registered trademarks 
and consider all the places where they appear.  The first question is whether, 
through the program of registering trademarks the government provides 
private individuals or entities access to property or a program for the 
purpose of producing speech.  As noted above, the purpose of the trademark 
program is to facilitate commerce by granting exclusive use of words or 
symbols.470  Although in an important sense, the government limits speech 
rather than expands it through the trademark program, the program enhances 
the ability of trademark owners to produce speech as a means to 
accomplishing a non-speech purpose.471  In this way, the government has a 
purpose to produce speech. 
The next question is how the restrictions imposed on trademark content 
fulfill the government’s purpose.  Do they tailor the private speech so that its 
content fulfills a legitimate government function or to avoid interference 
with government functions or objectives outside the purpose of the 
trademark program?  When this question is posed specifically, it seems quite 
clear that the federal government cannot plausibly assert that it intends to 
tailor the content of trademarks so that they individually, or in combination, 
send a government message.472  To test this conclusion, it is clear that the 
government cannot claim that commissions trademark speech to fulfill a 
determinate functional objective that requires it to speak or that, in tailoring 
trademark speech content, it occupies a customary or delegated role of 
speech curator or editor.  Because the federal government can make no 
 
 467. See id. at 454.  
 468. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 469. Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 453 (“[W]hat is at issue in this case [is] trademark 
registration, not the trademarks themselves.”); In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1345 (“Wisely, the 
government does not argue that a mark-holder’s use or enforcement of its federally registered 
trademark is government speech.”). 
 470. See supra note 464 and accompanying text.  
 471. See Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 460–61. 
 472. Cf. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1348 (“When the government registers a trademark, it regulates 
private speech.  It does not speak for itself.”). 
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plausible claim that by placing an “®” symbol on individual trademarks or 
listing the trademarks together in the Federal Registry it is trying to 
broadcast national identity or national commercial identity through the 
trademark program, the government speech inquiry should be at an end.473  
The trademark program is a created forum or a program that incidentally 
allows a private individual to speak but is not a forum at all.474 
A brief run through the Walker test illustrates the perils of attempting to 
apply it to access programs that do not present a plausible fit.  The federal 
government cannot show a history of messaging its own identity through the 
medium of registered trademarks.475  It has never messaged identity through 
the program exclusively.476  Rather, the program’s history reflects its 
purpose of distinguishing private statements of identity to serve the 
government purpose of facilitating private commercial transactions.477  As to 
prong two, viewers may perceive trademarks in commerce marked with the 
“®” symbol, although they need not always be, and listed in the Federal 
Registry.478  Both the “®” symbol and the Registry signal federal ownership 
of the program or property.479  Other signs of intermingling, however, are 
lacking.480  The private speech does not appear as an expressive fixture, 
embellishing and broadcasting from recognizable federal property.481  The 
Federal Register is not widely visible, is consulted by individuals with 
commercial purposes, is “owned” and operated by the Patent and Trademark 
Office and not by the federal government generally, and for these reasons is 
not a piece of property from which viewers would expect the federal 
government to broadcast identity through private submissions.482  Nor does it 
 
 473. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1348.  
 474. Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 462–63. 
 475. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1346.  
 476. See Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 461–62.  
 477. See id.  
 478. See id. at 458–59.  
 479. See id.  
 480. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1346.  
 481. See id. at 1347.  
 482. See Getting Started with Trademarks, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www. 
uspto.gov/trademark (last modified Nov. 4, 2016, 5:32 PM) (allowing for a web search of the 
trademark data base).  Although the contents of the Principal Register can be found by the public, 
registered trademarks are not published to the public individually or as grouping in a way that would 
indicate a government intent to use private participants for identity speech or condition viewers to 
expect that speech in the medium is government identity speech.  Id. 
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bear marks of identity-conforming mandates that signal an expressive 
association.483  The single conforming feature is the “®” symbol, which, as 
noted above, need not appear for private speakers to gain the benefit of the 
program.484  Importantly, nothing about the “®” symbol signals that the 
government has imposed restrictions or required modifications on the 
content or presentation of the private submissions to tailor and merge the 
identity presented by registered trademarks individually, or as a “parade.”485  
Finally, the government’s policies and procedures do not indicate imposition 
of identity-conforming mandates, which would be necessary to demonstrate 
a purpose of using private speech content to send an identity message. 
C. Advertising Space 
In programs that sell “advertising space,” the government’s purpose is to 
make money.486  The purpose of the advertisers, however, is to produce and 
broadcast speech.487  The government intentionally uses the means of 
broadcasting speech to serve the function of making money, so a purpose of 
the programs is to produce speech.488  The next inquiry asks why the 
government asserts that it needs to restrict the content of advertising speech.  
If the government acknowledges that it restricts the content of submissions 
to avoid interference with government functions or objectives outside the 
purpose of the advertising program, then the program is a forum.489  If the 
government claims, however, that in addition to making money, it intends to 
tailor the content of the “advertisements” to a government function, then the 
evidence of the government’s policy and practice must be examined to 
determine whether the program meets the requirements of a type of 
government speech program.490  It is possible that some types of programs 
that require participants to pay for space may fit into a type other than 
 
 483. See id. 
 484. See supra note 465 and accompanying text.  
 485. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1348.  
 486. See Catherine Rampell, On School Buses, Ad Space for Rent, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/16/business/media/16buses.html?_r=0. 
 487. See id. 
 488. See id.  
 489. See Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2015).  
 490. See id. at 496–97.  
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identity speech.491  If a program does not fit one of these types, which is 
more likely, then the Walker test is the tool to determine if the program 
produces identity speech. 
The Walker Court quickly distinguished a city’s program of selling 
advertising space on car cards located inside city buses from specialty 
license plate designs.492  It relied upon a prong-one determination that the 
medium of advertising space has traditionally been available for private 
speech, and a prong-two determination that the private speech “bore no 
indicia” that it was owned or conveyed by the government.493  The Court did 
not mention prong three, which was wise, given that the city’s exercise of 
“final approval authority” after deep and thorough review of the proposed 
political advertisement was what provoked the lawsuit.494  As noted above, 
government entities typically administer advertising programs under 
programs that require prior submission and involve back-and-forth review 
that may result in requested modifications to the message proposed by the 
private speaker.495  The primary distinguishing features between advertising 
programs that produce private speech and money-making government 
identity speech programs are the extent to which the government exercises 
deep review of submissions and imposes identity-conforming mandates in its 
policy and practice, and whether viewers are likely to perceive these 
affirmative behaviors as fusing the private expression into a government 
identity message.496 
Some programs addressed by lower courts provide examples of identity-
conforming mandates imposed to a greater degree than in the typical sale of 
“advertising space.”497  One court found public radio “sponsorship” 
announcements produced government speech.498  Although the court did not 
 
 491. For example, a city could “commission” private vendors to provide live demonstrations and 
sell produce at a “Cook with Vegetables” event, and charge a fee to participate.  
 492. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2252 (2015).  
 493. Id. 
 494. See id. at 2249, 2252.  
 495. See id. at 2242.   
 496. Coleman v. Ann Arbor Transp. Auth., 904 F. Supp. 2d 670, 696–97 (E.D. Mich. 2012) 
(“[E]ven if private speech takes place on government property, that does not, without more, suffice 
to create government speech. . . . The Court concludes that no additional element is present here and, 
therefore, the ads on AATA buses are not government speech.”). 
 497. See discussion supra Section I.D.2. 
 498. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093 (8th Cir. 
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specifically address the type of identity speech, it noted the identity-
conforming features that distinguish public radio sponsorship 
announcements from typical advertisements.499  These are that the 
government broadcaster “exercises control not only over the decision to 
accept or reject the donations, but also over the form and content of the 
announcements themselves.”500  Staff members “compose, edit, and review 
acknowledgment scripts to insure compliance with both [federal] and 
internal guidelines.”501  Moreover, “the station does not broadcast “pre-
produced” announcements submitted by underwriters; instead, employees 
themselves read the acknowledgments on air.”502 
In another, more recent case, an Eleventh Circuit panel applied the 
Walker test to find banners thanking “sponsors” hung on school fences were 
government identity speech.503  The court distinguished “purely private 
advertising,” which “convey[s] the words, pictures, and colors that the 
advertiser wants to convey” from the banners, which were “printed in school 
colors [and] subject to uniform design requirements . . . . [and] b[ore] the 
initials of the school and identifie[d] the sponsor as a ‘partner’ with the 
school.”504 
Other access programs, not yet addressed by courts under the Walker 
test, exist at the boundary between government identity speech and forums 
that sell advertising space.505  Thus far, courts have addressed buy-a-brick 
programs as forums, even though submissions generally appear as 
expressive fixtures on government property and are generally subject to a 
number of identity-conforming mandates that support the appearance of an 
expressive association with the government entity that hosts the speech.506  
“Sponsorship” programs take various forms, appear on different types of 
 
2000). 
 499. See id. at 1995–96.  The court also relied on the radio station’s professional role as an editor.  
Id. 
 500. Id. at 1994.  
 501. Id.  
 502. Id.  
 503. See Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1075 (11th Cir. 2015).  
 504. Id. at 1077. 
 505. See NAACP v. City of Phila., 2016 WL 4435626, at *18 (3d Cir. Aug. 23, 2016).  
 506. See Tong v. Chi. Park Dist., 316 F. Supp. 2d 645 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Demmon v. Loudoun Cty. 
Pub. Schs., 279 F. Supp. 2d 689 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
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government property, are permanent to varying degrees,507 and are subject to 
identity-conforming mandates.508  The boundary between government 
identity-speech programs and forums will need to be based on the particular 
context, with the relevant inquiry being the extent to which the government 
intends to merge its identity with the sponsor and the extent to which 
viewers are likely to perceive it, because the private speech appears as an 
expressive fixture on government property or as part of an expressive 
association branded as part of the government’s identity. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has twice confirmed that when government entities broadcast 
privately produced messages for the purpose and with the effect of sending a 
message about their own “image” or “identity,” their viewpoint-based 
selections among messages are not constrained by the Constitution’s Free 
Speech Clause.509  This ability to exercise broad discretion to privilege or 
disadvantage private speakers exists in stark contrast to the bedrock rule 
against viewpoint discrimination, which applies when government entities 
create private speech forums.  Despite the different constitutional rules that 
apply to government conduct, the two types of government–private speech 
interactions—use of private speakers to send government identity messages 
and accommodation of private speakers in private speech forums—hardly 
differ at all to the naked eye.  The three-pronged test articulated by the Court 
in Walker is the tool that government entities and lower courts must use to 
distinguish the two types of programs.510  Courts have already split trying to 
apply it to new types of programs, suggesting that the meaning of the prongs 
beyond the particular contexts of park monuments and specialty license 
plates is not obvious.511  A broader and deeper meaning for the test, 
however, can be found and will assist government entities and courts 
 
 507. See, e.g., United Veterans Mem’l & Patriotic Ass’n v. City of New Rochelle, 72 F. Supp. 3d 
468, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[F]lags are displayed for long periods of time (until they become 
tattered) and then promptly replaced, [so] their presence . . . is nearly as constant as that of . . . park 
monuments.”).  
 508. See id. at 476.  
 509. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.  
 510. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
 511. See discussion supra Section I.D.2. 
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navigating the divide.512 
Courts need to consider all of these prongs in any particular case, 
implementing them with the competing principles of democratic function 
and equal access in mind.  The Walker test is one side of a two-faceted 
inquiry into programs where government entities interact with private 
speakers.  Whenever a court applies the Walker test to determine whether the 
government has fused private speech into government identity speech, it is 
also asking whether the same evidence indicates that the speech remains 
“purely private,” and thus, takes place in a forum where threshold 
nondiscrimination limits apply.513  Understanding both sides of the Walker 
test makes it more complete, useful, and likely to strike a principled balance 
between the majority’s ability to assert its will in speech selections and the 
right of individuals to demand equal speaking space. 
 
 
 512. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 513. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246 (finding that the Court’s “precedents regarding government 
speech (and not [its] precedents regarding forums for private speech) provide[d] the appropriate 
framework through which to approach the case”).  
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